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ABSTRACT 
 
A permissionless innovation regulatory model, importantly 
featuring a default presumption of approval of innovators’ new ac-
tivities, is credited with fostering the development of the Internet.  
For the first time, this regulatory model is being explored for adop-
tion in the outer space domain, a reasonable choice given the 
amount of innovation by commercial entities in that sector.  How-
ever, translation of the model to outer space is complex because 
permissionless innovation is contextual, and the outer space do-
main differs from the cyber domain in important respects. First, in-
ternational obligations require the U.S. government to authorize 
and supervise commercial space activities.  Second, national securi-
ty concerns are raised by everyday, non-illicit space activities.  
Third, space business investors actually demand enhanced regula-
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tory certainty given the risk, and often long-time horizons, of their 
investments. 
New on-orbit space activities, such as asteroid mining, satellite 
servicing, debris removal, and lunar habitats and research facilities, 
currently fall within a regulatory gap—the Executive Branch lacks 
express Congressional delegation to regulate such activities.  This 
situation may appear to be a victory for proponents of a nearly 
pure or unadulterated version of permissionless innovation.  In-
deed, to protect the status quo, permissionless innovation advo-
cates are ignoring long-established and agreed upon rules of treaty 
interpretation to argue that the U.S. government is not under an 
obligation to authorize and supervise U.S. commercial space com-
panies’ activities. 
The irony is that the current gap actually undermines the bene-
fits of permissionless innovation.  The Executive Branch faces a 
Hobbesian choice of following Congressional intent and standing 
aside as new on-orbit activities are engaged in or complying with 
international obligations and addressing potential national security 
concerns by continuing to leverage existing authorities in an at-
tempt to reach on-orbit activities.  U.S. commercial space business-
es—the innovators—are left in a similarly difficult situation: facing 
a risk of foreign government retaliation in the event of the U.S. 
government’s non-compliance with international obligations, or 
being forced to engage in costly and time-consuming litigation if 
the U.S. government blocks their proposed activity by stretching 
existing authorities.  Fortunately, the U.S. Congress can enact a so-
lution that fills the gap—providing compliance with international 
obligations, protection of national security, and regulatory certain-
ty for U.S. space businesses—and at the same time ensure that 
permissionless innovation thinking and esprit de corps control the 
interagency approval process, including a default presumption in 
favor of approval. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A permissionless innovation regulatory model is credited with 
growing the Internet.  This model allows new technologies to be 
developed and deployed without government permission, or as lit-
tle permission as possible.1  Recently, for the first time, policy-
makers are raising the question of whether a permissionless inno-
vation regulatory model is possible in the increasingly commercial-
ized outer space domain, particularly for new activities, and if so, 
what would it look like and what would its limits be.  As House 
Science Committee Space Subcommittee Chairman Brian Babin 
stated recently: 
[T]his question of how we will regulate our private sector 
activities is not simply academic.  I believe it is one of the 
fundamental space policy questions of our time.  America is 
great because it is a country where you have the freedom to 
create without government permission.  We are all free, un-
less we chose, through our legislative process, to limit our 
freedoms.2 
Of course, permissionless innovation is rarely pure in the sense 
of being an argument for no regulation.  Rather, it is a way of 
thinking that runs counter to the precautionary principle3—a prin-
ciple that promotes regulation to protect from harms not yet prov-
en or identified. 
While permissionless innovation has framed regulatory de-
bates in the cyber and telecommunications arena for decades, its 
transition to the space domain is recent—driven by viable new 
                                                      
1 See generally ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING 
CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM (2016) (arguing for a public 
policy allowing for permissionless innovation in the modern tech industry). 
2 See Brian Babin, Chairman, Space Comm. of the H. Sci. Comm., Remarks to 
FAA Commercial Space Transportation Conference, 16-17 (Feb. 7, 2017), transcript 
available at http://groundbasedspacematters.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/CBB-speech-to-FAA-conference-Feb-7-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7H4S-VJUJ] (stating that the space sector is not unique in this 
respect as the same questions are being raised with respect to a whole host of new 
technologies and their associated business models, including autonomous 
vehicles, the sharing economy, robots, and 3D printing, among others). 
3 Thierer, supra note 1. 
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business models and technologies that will expand commercial ac-
tivities in the space domain.  New space activities beyond the tradi-
tional satellite communications and remote sensing markets are 
drawing significant investment and displaying rapid technological 
development.  These new space businesses are engaged in the pur-
suit of commercial human space flight,4 space resource mining,5 
commercial habitats in-orbit and on the Moon,6 lunar rovers,7 and 
on-orbit servicing of satellites,8 including refueling and repairs. 
However, technology and business model innovation is also 
occurring in traditional sectors of the space economy, including 
launch, remote sensing, and communications sectors.  Reusable 
booster rocket systems are on the way, with multiple companies 
successfully landing first stages, and one even contracting to reuse 
a first stage for a satellite launch.9  Similarly disruptive, several 
companies are developing new, low-cost launch vehicles for small 
satellites.10  Ever-improving technologies are leading to higher res-
                                                      
4 See, e.g., VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/GT62-VFMW] (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (proposing tourism-
supported spaceflight); see also BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/XZ4V-7C2P] (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (proposing technology 
for commercial spaceflight). 
5 See, e.g., PLANETARY RESOURCES, http://www.planetaryresources.com 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ5U-MSSU] (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (presenting itself as 
the future leading provider of resources in space); DEEP SPACE IND., INC., 
http://deepspaceindustries.com/ [https://perma.cc/L9EB-EHNG] (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2017) (introducing asteroid mining and its impact on the space economy). 
6 See, e.g., BIGELOW AEROSPACE, http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/S5XQ-K9RC] (last visited Feb. 24, 2017) (calling for the 
building of new types of space station). 
7 See, e.g., MOON EXPRESS, http://moonexpress.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/4TX5-SE37] (last visited Aug. 11, 2017) (intending to use the 
Moon’s resources for the benefit of humanity). 
8 See, e.g., Juliet Van Wegenen, In-Orbit Services Experts See Bright Future, 
Challenges, VIA SATELLITE (Sept. 3, 2015), 
http://www.satellitetoday.com/technology/2015/09/03/in-orbit-services-
experts-see-bright-future-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/6A7U-JGP9] (describing 
how in-orbit servicing of satellites is a critical part of space infrastructure). 
9 See, e.g., Peter B. de Selding, SpaceX’s Reusable Falcon 9: What Are The Real 
Cost Savings For Customers ?, SPACENEWS (Apr. 25, 2016), 
http://spacenews.com/spacexs-reusable-falcon-9-what-are-the-real-cost-savings-
for-customers [https://perma.cc/RE6F-3EVV] (announcing that SpaceX would be 
the first, after NASA, to successfully reuse rocket hardware cost-effectively). 
10 Doug Messier, Multiple Small Satellite Launch Vehicles Under Development, 
PARABOLIC ARC (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.parabolicarc.com/2015/09/23/multiple-small-satellite-launch-
vehicles-development/ [https://perma.cc/65VB-WJBM] (declaring that at least 
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olutions for remote sensing space systems.11  Small satellites are 
now capable of more sophisticated imagery, and imaging compa-
nies offer big data analytics based on more continuous imagery.12  
In communications, ideas for large Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constel-
lations providing satellite internet are on the table and are at vari-
ous stages of implementation by several companies.13  These new 
constellations can lead to potential spectrum battles between more 
traditional Geostationary Orbit (GEO) satellites and LEO satellites, 
and among competing LEO systems.  New developments in the 
race to 5G terrestrial wireless also create spectrum competition (as 
well as potential sharing models) with satellite systems,14 both 
GEO and LEO.  Collectively, all these developments and plans cre-
ate predictions for large increases in the number of launches over 
the next decade.15 
                                                      
twenty launch vehicles for small satellites are currently under development 
around the world). 
11 See Colin Clark, DigitalGlobe, Eager for Foreign Biz, Presses NOAA for Quarter 
Meter Resolution, BREAKING DEF. (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/digitalglobe-hoping-for-foreign-biz-
presses-noaa-for-quarter-meter-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/C9VS-GUKG] 
(revealing that the digital satellite imagery industry, dominated by DigitalGlobe, 
is adapting image resolution to the demands of the international market). 
12 See, e.g., Kevin M. O’Connell, President and CEO, Innovative Analytics & 
Training, LLC and Outgoing Chair of NOAA’s Federal ACCRES, Testimony 
before H. Sci. Comm. Space Sub-Comm.: “Commercial Remote Sensing: 
Facilitating Innovation and Leadership” (Sept. 7, 2016) (transcript available at 
https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents
/Kevin%20M.%20O%27Connell%20House%20Science%20Committee%20Testimo
ny%20Final.pdf) [https://perma.cc/W5U8-SRF8] (calling for the update of U.S. 
policy and regulatory mechanisms to keep leadership in the space area). 
13 See, e.g., Jeff Foust, The Return of Satellite Constellations, THE SPACE REV. 
(Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2716/1 
[https://perma.cc/9VXY-QNP7] (describing the effort by several competing 
companies to create broadband communications services using space technology). 
14 See, e.g., Peter B. de Selding, Satellite Sector Mulls How to Live with FCC’s 5G 
Decision, SPACENEWS (July 22, 2016), http://spacenews.com/satellite-sector-mulls-
how-to-live-with-fccs-5g-decision/ [https://perma.cc/6SBY-7H78] (retelling the 
reactions to the FCC’s ruling denying protected status to satellite systems that 
have been investing in Ka-band spectrum). 
15 See FAA, 2015 COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION FORECASTS (Apr. 2015), 
transcript available at 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/Com
mercial_Space_Transportation_Forecasts_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7ET-
G37N] (discussing geosynchronous and non-geosynchronous orbit launch 
demand forecast). 
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In creating regulatory approaches for new activities, and exam-
ining existing regulatory approaches for traditional activities, the 
question is whether the U.S. can adopt a permissionless innovation 
regime and if so, what it would look like, and what its limits or 
bounds would be.  In answering these questions, one must realize 
the unique nature of the outer space domain vis-à-vis the cyber 
domain and appreciate the differences between activities in these 
two domains.  First, in the outer space domain, the U.S. is under an 
international obligation to “authoriz[e]” and provide “continuing 
supervision” for its non-governmental (commercial) space activi-
ties, and further is made “[internationally] responsib[le]” for such 
activities.16  There is no such obligation in the cyber domain; in-
deed there are few international laws governing the cyber domain 
at all.17  Second, everyday, non-illicit activities in the space domain, 
and even the mere act of getting to outer space, more directly im-
plicate national security concerns than everyday cyber activities.  
Most activities in the cyber domain, except theft of national secrets 
and trade secrets of the industrial complex, or interference with 
critical infrastructure (or elections), do not implicate national secu-
rity concerns.  Third, the capital investment dynamics of the two 
domains are different.  Investment in space activities is not only 
risky but many projects have incredibly long time-horizons to prof-
itability.  Space investors worry about regulatory risk if permis-
sionless innovation models do not, at a minimum, create a stable, 
transparent process that is consistent with U.S. international obli-
gations and U.S. national security concerns.  For all these reasons, 
(nearly) pure versions of permissionless innovation would create 
substantial risks for the growth and development of the U.S. com-
mercial space industry. 
Thus, maintaining the regulatory status quo featuring a gap in 
the U.S. government regulatory authority over on-orbit space ac-
tivities will defeat the purposes of permissionless innovation de-
spite appearing to create a (nearly) pure form of permissionless in-
novation.  The Congress made clear back in 1997 that it did not 
                                                      
16 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VI, 
opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. 
17 See, e.g., Jason Healy & Hannan Pitts, Applying International Environmental 
Legal Norms to Cyber Statecraft, I/S J. 356, 359-62 (2012) (noting “little” law 
governing the technical approach to the internet and the lack of global adherence 
to the Budapest Convention addressing criminal aspects of cyber security). 
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wish to allocate regulatory authority over on-orbit activities (other 
than remote sensing and spectrum use) to the Executive Branch.18  
Yet, the Executive Branch is keenly aware of its international obli-
gation to authorize and supervise such activities as well as the po-
tential national security implications of such activities.19  The status 
quo leaves a Hobbesian choice for the Executive Branch.  When a 
new activity is proposed, the Executive Branch can stand aside, ful-
ly yielding to Congressional intent, to the detriment of U.S. com-
pliance with its international obligations and potential national se-
curity concerns.  Alternatively, the Executive Branch can seek to 
leverage its existing payload review authority to block or authorize 
(depending on circumstances) post-payload deployment on-orbit 
activities, ensuring compliance with U.S. international obligations 
and protection of national security, but exceeding Congress’ dele-
gation.  For the industry, the innovators, the situation is no better.  
They may engage in an activity that was not properly authorized 
as required by U.S. international obligations and risk foreign ac-
tions that might block their markets or businesses from cooperat-
ing with the U.S. innovator.  Alternatively, U.S. space businesses 
may be forced to resort to litigation to challenge the U.S. Executive 
Branch action.  Litigation can consume valuable time and money 
and is undertaken with the realization that the U.S. government is 
a substantial customer of U.S. commercial space businesses.  For-
tunately, with some adjustments to current Executive Branch and 
Congressional proposals for regulating new on-orbit activities, the 
Hobbesian choice can be eliminated.  Better still, permissionless in-
novation thinking can still pervade the U.S. regulatory approach to 
such activities while complying with U.S. international obligations, 
protecting U.S. national security, and providing adequate regulato-
ry certainty for space industry investors. 
Section 2 of this paper discusses the concept of permissionless 
innovation, giving examples from the cyber domain that contain 
potential lessons for the outer space domain.  Section 3 discusses 
the current status of permissionless innovation in the U.S. regula-
tion of traditional activities in the space domain, looking at the ex-
                                                      
18 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 105-347 (1997). 
19 See Letter from John Holdren, Dir. & Asst. to President for Sci. and Tech., 
to Sen. Thune and Rep. Smith (Apr. 4, 2016) (on file with author) 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/csla
_report_4-4-16_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XHL-VQHJ] (proposing legislation 
to ensure compliance with OST Article VI). 
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amples of launch, remote sensing, and communications licensing 
regimes.  Section 4 analyzes three key risks to pursuing a (nearly) 
pure version of permissionless innovation in regulating new on-
orbit activities.  Section 5 examines the three significant proposals 
released in the past two years to fill the regulatory gap that exists 
with respect to new on-orbit activities—one emerging from the 
Obama Administration’s Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(OSTP) through an interagency process, one arising from a Con-
gressman recently nominated to be the next NASA Administrator, 
and one adopted by the U.S. House Science Committee.  Section 6 
proposes eight friendly amendments to the approaches on the table 
that maximize permissionless innovation thinking and esprit de 
corps while at the same time ensuring compliance with U.S. inter-
national obligations, protection of U.S. national security, and regu-
latory certainty for companies.  It also recommends against two 
other amendments or approaches that have been proposed by 
(nearly) pure permissionless innovation advocates.  Part 7 con-
cludes. 
 
2.  THE ESSENCE OF PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION 
 
Permissionless innovation as a concept evades exact definition 
or categorization.  Sometimes the term refers to avoiding private 
permissions (e.g., from patent holders) as well as authorization 
from the government.  In this article, the concept will only be used 
to refer to avoiding (or limiting) the need for government permis-
sion to develop and deploy technology. 
One of the leading studies on permissionless innovation20 
frames the discussion by contrasting it with precautionary princi-
ple thinking—that calls for regulation even in the absence of identi-
fiable, provable harms.  Importantly, it is a concept in which a 
range of actual regulatory policy approaches can fit.  Indeed, one 
can view permissionless innovation regulatory approaches along a 
continuum.21  A pure or unadulterated version of permissionless 
innovation would mean that the development and deployment of 
technology is subject to no regulation or government approvals 
                                                      
20 Thierer, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
21 See id. at 105–107 (labeling permissionless innovation on a risk response 
continuum). 
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(i.e., ”you may develop and deploy the technology how you wish 
and where you wish”).  On the opposite end of the continuum 
would be a hyper-precautionary principle (or anti-permissionless 
innovation), involving a complete prohibition of the development 
and deployment of technology (i.e., ”you may neither develop nor 
deploy the technology anywhere at anytime”).  We find few exam-
ples of technology regulation at the far ends of the continuum, alt-
hough there are a few, such as prohibitions on certain genetic clon-
ing on the one side.  Some believe that the current U.S. approach to 
new space activities, which is essentially a regulatory gap, comes 
close to a pure permissionless innovation approach.  However, the 
situation is a bit more clouded in reality. 
As a variety of regulatory approaches are plotted along the 
continuum, it is important to view permissionless innovation as a 
frame of mind or way of thinking.  The way of thinking emphasiz-
es the default should be to allow technology development and de-
ployment in the absence of identified, serious harms.22  The essence 
of permissionless innovation thinking can be detected not only 
where permission is the policy default, but also by a variety of re-
lated factors, including where trust is placed in industry self-
regulation, insurance markets, educate and empower solutions, 
and the common law to solve legal problems.  Where such solu-
tions fail, targeted legal solutions are adopted after conducting a 
“benefit-cost analysis.”23  One might add as corollaries that permis-
sion decisions, to the extent needed, will be timely, transparent, 
and afford opportunities to cure defects found in initial proposals 
or applications.  Innovation is stifled by delays, hidden rationales 
for decisions, and the inability to adjust proposed innovation to 
public policy concerns. 
Permissionless innovation debates historically and even today 
are on display most prominently in the cyber domain.  Three re-
cent examples from the cyber domain contain possible lessons for 
the new debate over permissionless innovation possibilities in the 
outer space domain.  First, use of the term in the cyber domain 
                                                      
22 See id. at 4 (discussing the risk response continuum wherein regulation of 
technological development should be avoided in the absence of identified harms). 
23 See Adam Thierer & Michael Wilt, Permissionless Innovation: A 10-Point 
Checklist for Public Policymakers, GEO. MASON (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/permissionless-innovation-10-point-
checklist-public-policymakers [https://perma.cc/UGD2-95RH] (eliminating some 
factors on their list that are specifically or mostly geared towards the cyber 
domain). 
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helps one understand that a regulatory approach can fit within a 
permissionless innovation framework even if it is not a pure ver-
sion.  For example, leading telecommunications companies assert 
that so-called “Part 15 rules” (more specifically 47 C.F.R. Ch. 15 
rules of the FCC governing unlicensed spectrum transmissions) 
qualify as a permissionless innovation framework.24  But even here, 
devices that rely on unlicensed spectrum to operate must meet 
minimal standards so as not to interfere unnecessarily with other 
devices or with Wi-Fi connections relying on the same unlicensed 
spectrum.  The recent complaint by large telecommunications 
companies concerning LTE-U devices that use the unlicensed spec-
trum is that meeting existing Part 15 criteria may no longer be suf-
ficient and that they may now have to go through additional inter-
ference testing, creating in their words a “Mother-may-I” 
situation.25  The worry of the major telecommunications operators 
interested in LTE-U is that the Wi-Fi Alliance, a proponent of addi-
tional interference testing, is moving the pre-existing point of regu-
lation too far along the continuum to qualify as permissionless in-
novation anymore. 
Second, use of the concept in the cyber domain by competing 
industries or industries at different levels within the network may 
be illuminating in several contexts in the space domain, including 
the traditional satellite communications market and potentially 
new activities such as asteroid or lunar mining.  Permissionless in-
novation, in part due to its somewhat malleable character with no 
single defining test, is used as a rhetorical tool by parties on both 
sides of the “net neutrality” debate.  “Net neutrality” posits that in-
ternet service providers (ISPs) should not be able to discriminate 
against certain types of traffic over others.26  Application creators 
and large-bandwidth using video providers argue that their inno-
vation will be stifled if ISPs can slow their traffic or charge exces-
sive fees for transmitting such traffic.  ISPs argue that their innova-
tion, in both technology and pricing/business model structures, 
                                                      
24 See Joan Marsh, A Return to Permissionless Innovation, AT&T (Aug. 22, 2016), 
https://www.attpublicpolicy.com/wi-fi/a-return-to-permission-less-innovation/ 
[https://perma.cc/9DRN-6SQ7] (demonstrating that AT&T identifies unlicensed 
spectrum FCC Part 15 rules as fitting within the permissionless innovation 
framework). 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Net Neutrality: Something Old, Something 
New, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 665 (2015) (arguing against open internet rules and for 
handling violations of net neutrality on a case-by-case basis). 
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will be hindered if the government prevents them from fully con-
sidering different bandwidth demands of different applications on 
their networks.  The net neutrality or Open Internet Order adopted 
by the FCC in 201527 that sought a middle road and still allows for 
“reasonable” traffic management practices, leaves ISPs guessing if 
their view of reasonableness ultimately comports with the FCC’s 
view,28 and application creators wondering if their customers will 
be blocked or slowed when utilizing their applications.  The net 
neutrality debate demonstrates that a regulatory approach can, in 
essence, express a preference for one company’s or one industry’s 
technological or business case innovation possibilities over another 
or, alternatively, can strike a clouded middle ground potentially 
harming innovation in several companies or industries. 
Third, use of the permissionless innovation concept in the ap-
proach of some Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commissioners in 
the cyber realm allows one to think about several important dis-
tinctions in regulatory approaches and their impact on permission-
less innovation thinking: distinguishing ex ante and ex post gov-
ernment interventions and substantive/generally applicable versus 
procedural/case-by-case approaches to regulation.  For example, 
FTC Commissioner Ohlhausen believes the FTC approach to inter-
net concerns such as privacy, fraud, and security is superior to the 
FCC’s approach because of the FTC’s focus on ex post, case-by-case 
enforcement to a greater degree than ex ante substantive regula-
tion.  As she describes it: 
The FTC’s process is enforcement-centric rather than rule-
making-centric.  As such, it is ex post rather than ex ante and 
case-by-case rather than one-size-fits-all.  Since an enforce-
ment action requires a complaint and a case to move ahead, 
the FTC’s method typically focuses on actual, or at least 
specifically alleged, harms rather than attempt to predict 
future harms more generally. 
                                                      
27 In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC 15-24 (Feb. 26, 
2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A7RM-Y92T]. 
28 See Randolph J. May & Seth L. Cooper, The FCC Threatens the Rule of Law: A 
Focus on Agency Enforcement and Merger Review Abuses, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y L. REV. 
54, 55 (2016) (discussing the FCC’s catch-all standard of reasonableness which 
states “that an internet service provider ‘shall not unreasonably interfere with or 
unreasonably  disadvantage’ end users or edge content or application providers”). 
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Because of these structural differences, the FTC’s enforce-
ment process is less affected by the systemic knowledge 
problems of the FCC’s prescriptive ex ante rulemaking ap-
proach. . . 
Thus, the FTC’s approach facilitates . . . “permissionless in-
novation,” . . . better than a prescriptive rulemaking ap-
proach.  The proof, as they say, is in the pudding.  As the 
Internet—the most dynamic technological environment in 
history—has become an increasingly integral part of socie-
ty, the FTC’s enforcement-centric approach has enabled it 
to protect consumers and competition online even while 
industry has continued to innovate.  In fact, the FTC is al-
ready addressing major Internet-centric concerns, including 
new issues in privacy, fraud, advertising and other con-
sumer protection issues, along with competition issues.29 
The regulation of space activities in a permissionless innova-
tion manner needs to be distinguished from what Commissioner 
Ohlhausen sees in FTC regulation of the cyber domain.  Regulation 
of space activities in contrast to cyber activities does not involve 
the full expanse of every industry.  True, there are a variety of in-
dustries in the space sector, but they are not nearly as expansive as 
all those industries active in the cyber domain.  Additionally, in 
looking at space activities, the greater possibility of national securi-
ty harms from every-day, non-illicit activities dictate advanced 
consideration of an activity’s impact. Indeed, what currently exists 
for traditional space activities (launch, remote sensing, communi-
cations) are licensing regimes in which the applicant provides in-
formation that is reviewed for its potential impact on national se-
curity and a limited number of other factors.  In other words, 
regulation of traditional activities in space involves most promi-
nently an ex ante, case-by-case analysis, and the industry specific 
expertise of regulators as well as national security concerns justifies 
the ex ante approach in the space domain.  National security harms 
outweigh all other harms—and provide the easiest justification for 
ex ante examination.  The case for ex ante examination of space ac-
tivities is further buttressed by U.S. international obligations re-
quiring authorization—official permission in advance according to 
                                                      
29 Maureen Ohlhausen, The Procrustean Problem with Prescriptive Regulation, 23 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 7 (2014) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/4
 
2017] Contours of Permissionless Innovation 117 
the ordinary meaning of that term—of space activities engaged in 
by U.S. commercial companies.  A leading permissionless innova-
tion study places “anticipatory regulation” to include “licensing 
and permits” closer to precautionary principle thinking than per-
missionless innovation thinking.30  However, where the license ap-
plications are subject to a narrow review and benefit from default 
presumption of approval, and where decisions are timely, trans-
parent, and appealable, and also incorporate at least one private or 
market mechanism, such as giving deference to industry stand-
ards, it is hard to see why such a “light touch” approach does not 
fall within the permissionless innovation thinking end of the con-
tinuum. 
A more detailed examination of the current licensing regimes 
in place for traditional activities– launches, remote sensing and 
spectrum usage by communications satellites—follows below. 
 
3.  EXISTING U.S. REGULATION OF TRADITIONAL ACTIVITIES: 
LAUNCH, REMOTE SENSING, AND COMMUNICATIONS 
 
Practically speaking, the United States government is aware of 
every American space asset launched, as Congress requires all 
launches to be licensed by the FAA, with a payload review as part 
of that process,31 and all radio frequency used by satellites for 
communication with Earth must be licensed by the FCC.32  Con-
gress imposes an additional layer of licensing on all commercial 
remote sensing space systems,33 an obligation interpreted in the 
past several years to include any satellite capable of sensing the 
Earth in the broadest sense instead of only those that intend to im-
age the planet’s surface.  This interpretation was adopted due to 
concerns over the national security implications of satellites that 
could take imagery of valuable military and diplomatic install-
ments and personnel. 
Thus, Congress has expressly allocated licensing authority for 
spectrum usage and remote sensing, but not for other on-orbit ac-
tivities.  New on-orbit activities currently sit in a regulatory 
                                                      
30 Thierer, supra note 1, at 105–07. 
31 51 U.S.C. §§ 50903–04 (2012). 
32 47 U.S.C. §§ 701–69 (2012). 
33 51 U.S.C. § 60101 (2012); 15 C.F.R. pt. 960 (2016). 
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“gap.”34  Indeed, the legislative history of amendments to the 1998 
Commercial Space Launch Act indicates that Congress did not in-
tend to allocate licensing authority to the FAA for on-orbit activi-
ties.35  Outside of spectrum use and remote sensing licensure, cur-
rently no Executive agency maintains clearly delineated authority 
to license or regulate on-orbit activities.36  For new space activities 
like asteroid mining, on-orbit servicing of satellites, space debris 
remediation, space hotels, and private research labs in space, the 
existing National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion’s (NOAA) and FCC licensing regimes are insufficient in some 
instances to guarantee American compliance with the provisions of 
Art. VI of the Outer Space Treaty (OST).  The OST is the seminal 
treaty addressing outer space activities that has over 100 countries 
party to it, including all major space powers.37 
In contrast to other activities, the lack of on-orbit or in-space li-
censing authority likely does not impact sub-orbital flights because 
one might say the launch and reentry of such vehicles are relatively 
seamless—with tourists enjoying 5-10 minutes of weightlessness.  
Indeed, the regulations actually define “launch” of a reusable 
launch vehicle for sub-orbital flight as only ending when the vehi-
cle touches down.38  Thus, the launch license already covers the en-
tire activity.  In essence, at least from a regulatory perspective, 
there is no on-orbit or in-space activity or reentry in such a case.  
Congress has legislated an elaborate scheme governing human 
space flight applicable to both sub-orbital and orbital flights.  
While commercial human space flight is nascent with no paid 
flights in the sub-orbital domain yet having taken place and only 
                                                      
34 See Michael Gold, Statement at the House Subcommittee on Aviation Hearing 
on “FAA Oversight of Commercial Space Transportation,” SPACEREF (June 22, 2016), 
http://spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=49019 [https://perma.cc/22Z3-
EVB8] (noting that all other countries with national space laws have a single 
national framework that is not divided into silos for specific activities); see also 
Frans von der Dunk, Effective Exercise of ‘In-Space Jurisdiction’: The U.S. Approach 
and the Problems it is Facing, 40 J. OF SPACE LAW (questioning if the broad structure 
of space regulation effectively applies to the modern space industry, especially 
within the United States). 
35 H.R. REP. NO. 105-347 (1997). 
36 Holdren Letter, supra note 19. 
37 UNCOPUOS, 55th Sess., Status of International Agreements Relating to 
Activities in Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2016/CRP.3 (Apr. 4, 2016), 
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/AC105_C2_201
6_CRP03E.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9KV-83JB]. 
38 51 U.S.C. § 50902 (2012); 14 C.F.R. § 401.5 (2016). 
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eight commercial orbital flights to date, all involving flights aboard 
Russia’s Soyuz craft to the ISS for a cost of roughly $20 million per 
trip,39 due to its extensive existing regulation by the United States it 
will be discussed along with the traditional activity of space 
launch.  But for the other new on-orbit space activities, there is on-
going debate whether the United States Executive Branch needs 
legislation granting it new authority in order to meet its OST obli-
gation to “authorize” and provide “continuing supervision” for its 
nationals’ space activities. 
 
3.1.  Permissionless Innovation and FAA Launch (and Re-Entry) 
Licensing & Regulation of Human Space Flight 
 
Any space launch or re-entry requires an FAA license.40  This is 
appropriate because orbital launch vehicles contain fuel that 
weighs around twenty times that of the rocket itself, and the size of 
re-entering first stages can equal that of six buses combined.41  In 
other words, space launch vehicles are essentially ballistic missile 
technology used for other purposes.42 
In deciding whether to award a license, the FAA conducts a 
policy review to determine whether there are any national security, 
foreign policy, or international obligation concerns; a safety review 
to assess any third party risk; a payload review;43 and an environ-
                                                      
39 See Rich McCormick, Russia’s Space Agency Plans to Resume ISS Tourist 
Flights in 2018, THE VERGE (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://www.theverge.com/2015/3/24/8286409/russias-space-agency-
roscosmos-space-tourist-flight-2018 [https://perma.cc/8GP6-53JB] (discussing 
that between 2001 and 2009, there were eight private trips made to the ISS). 
40 See 51 U.S.C. § 50904 (2013) (detailing the various restrictions on launches, 
operations, and reentries). 
41 See SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/falcon9 [https://perma.cc/RE6F-
3EVV] (last visited Feb. 26, 2017) (describing SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket as being 229 
feet high and 12 feet wide). 
42 See Karl Tate, How Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Work, SPACE (Feb. 1, 
2013), http://www.space.com/19601-how-intercontinental-ballistic-missiles-
work-infographic.html [https://perma.cc/49Q2-EQCT] (explaining how 
modified intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) work and noting that they 
were used by early Soviet and American manned orbital missions). 
43 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 415.1 to .70 (2016) (prescribing requirements for obtaining a 
license to launch a launch vehicle, other than a reusable launch vehicle (RLV)) 
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mental review.44  Further, a launch licensee is financially responsi-
ble to a large degree for third-party damages.  Namely, the launch 
licensee must procure third-party liability insurance equivalent to 
maximum probable loss (MPL) and insurance to cover any gov-
ernment liability, including damage to government property.45 
Federal law also requires the launch operator to engage in a series 
of cross-waivers of liability with its suppliers and contractors, its 
customers, and its customers’ suppliers and contractors.46  Conse-
quently, due to the federal cross-waiver regime, neither the com-
panies nor the individuals involved in the manufacture, operation, 
or purchase of launch services can sue one another for negligence 
nor gross negligence should an accident occur.47 
The FAA also conducts similar reviews for re-entry licenses.  
This is no longer theoretical because an American company has 
developed a launch vehicle in which the first stage—the largest 
and most-expensive stage—of the rocket is reentered for ultimate 
                                                      
44 See id. §§ 415.201-.400 (providing FAA requirements for environmental 
review). 
45 Matthew Schaefer, The Need for Federal Preemption and International 
Negotiations Regarding Liability Caps and Waivers of Liability in the U.S. Commercial 
Space Industry, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 223, 230–241 (2015) (“[T]he U.S. third-party 
liability regime is broken into three tiers. First, the U.S. government requires . . . 
that commercial space-flight operators obtain third-party liability insurance in the 
amount of the maximum probable loss (MPL), according to a calculation 
performed by the FAA . . . . Second, if third-party liability claims exceed the 
[MPL], the government has in essence made a statutory promise to pay for the 
next tier, or tranche, of up to $2.8 billion dollars in any third-party liability claims 
faced by a space-flight entity. In the third tier, where third-party claims exceed the 
MPL plus the amount of promised government indemnification, liability reverts 
back to the operator.”); see 51 U.S.C. §§ 50914–50915 (2013) (listing liability 
insurance and financial responsibility requirements, as well as U.S. government 
paying claims exceeding liability insurance and financial responsibility 
requirements of the licensee). 
46 See 51 U.S.C. § 50914(b) (describing requirements relevant to reciprocal 
waiver of claims); see also Schaefer, supra note 45, at 245–48 (describing the liability 
of Space Flight Participants (SFPs) under the Commercial Space Launch 
Amendments Act of 2004). 
47 Schaefer, supra note 45, at 245–48. 
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reuse.48  Moreover, another company has tested first stage re-
entry.49 
Evidence suggests that launch licenses almost operate with a de 
facto presumption of approval, and Congress has even established 
a separate category of experimental permits to ensure that less well 
tested vehicles can undergo testing and innovation.50  Additionally, 
Congress recently made clear that a company can operate under 
and maintain an experimental permit to continue testing im-
provements while also maintaining a launch license for the same 
launch vehicle.51 
While Congress has not put forth a legal presumption of ap-
proval, it has declared in numerous enactments the importance of 
developing a vibrant commercial space launch capacity in the 
United States.52  The U.S. government even went so far as to help 
fund the development of new commercial space launch vehicles 
through milestone payments for technological improvements using 
                                                      
48 See, e.g., Romain Dillet, SpaceX Successfully Lands its First Stage Falcon 9 
Rocket at Cape Canaveral, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 19, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/19/spacex-successfully-lands-its-first-stage-
falcon-9-rocket-at-cape-canaveral/ [https://perma.cc/9AQC-CL5D] (“SpaceX . . . 
successfully landed the first stage of its Falcon 9 rocket at Cape Canaveral.”). 
49 See Dominic Gates, Bezos Says Blue Origin Achieves ‘Holy Grail of Rocketry,’ 
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
aerospace/jeff-bezoss-blue-origin-reaches-milestone-with-reusable-rocket/ 
[https://perma.cc/PKB4-S67V] (“Blue Origin space-travel company successfully 
sent a rocket 62 miles up into space and then . . . landed it upright just four-and-a-
half feet from the center of its launchpad.”). 
50 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 437.1–.17 (prescribing requirements for obtaining an 
experimental permit and maintaining a permit). 
51 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 
§ 104, 129 Stat. 704, 706-07 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 51 
U.S.C.). 
52 51 U.S.C. § 50901(a)(7)–(8) (2011) (“(7) the United States should encourage 
private sector launches, reentries, and associated services and, only to the extent 
necessary, regulate those launches, reentries, and services to ensure compliance 
with international obligations of the United States and to protect the public health 
and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy interests of 
the United States; (8) space transportation, including the establishment and 
operation of launch sites, reentry sites, and complementary facilities, the 
providing of launch services and reentry services, the establishment of support 
facilities, and the providing of support services, is an important element of the 
transportation system of the United States, and in connection with the commerce 
of the United States there is a need to develop a strong space transportation 
infrastructure with significant private sector involvement.”). 
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“other transaction authority” under NASA’s statutory authority.53  
In fact, there are new media reports that Elon Musk, SpaceX’s 
owner, is engaging in “permissionless innovation” through his de-
velopment of reusable first stage boosters,54 although it bears men-
tioning that the claim may be due to a misunderstanding that 
SpaceX’s reentry landings—first done on barges in the ocean—still 
require FAA approval. 
With respect to human space flight, federal law only requires 
space operators to obtain informed consent from space flight par-
ticipants (“SFPs”).55  Congress recently added SFPs to the full fed-
eral cross waiver through 2025, such that SFPs will not be able to 
sue, at least for the next ten years, for personal injury or death un-
less resulting from intentional misconduct by the launch opera-
tor.56  This overcomes the problem that had developed wherein a 
patchwork of state laws, riddled with gaps and ambiguities, 
sought with uncertain success to provide immunity to space 
launch operators from SFP suits.57 
Instead, insurers have begun offering SFPs liability insurance 
that SFPs may purchase.58  Whether the premium pricing of such 
insurance will be attractive to SFPs is still left to be seen.  Addi-
tionally, a so-called regulatory moratorium on launch vehicle de-
sign regulations aimed at protecting persons aboard those launch 
vehicles, originally enacted in 2004, was extended in 2015, and it 
                                                      
53 See generally COM. ORBITAL TRANSP. SERVS., A NEW ERA OF SPACE FLIGHT 
(2014) (providing a history of the NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation 
Services (COTS) program from 2006 to 2013). 
54 Joe Colangelo, What the SpaceX Landing Says About Elon Musk–and Federal 
Regulators, DAILY CALLER (Apr. 20, 2016), 
http://dailycaller.com/2016/04/20/what-the-spacex-landing-says-about-elon-
musk-and-federal-regulators/ [https://perma.cc/LFY5-UN9Q] (“Musk is 
practicing ‘permissionless innovation,’ which . . . means disrupting first and 
asking for permission later, exploiting regulatory blind-spots.”). 
55 See 51 U.S.C. § 50905(a)(5) (2012) (listing the requirements for the holder of 
a license or a permit to launch or reenter a space flight participant). 
56 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, supra note 51, 
§ 107 (describing requirements relevant to cross waivers). 
57 See Schaefer, supra note 45, at 245–55 (outlining liability issues relevant to 
SFPs under the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, contractual 
waivers under state common law, and state legislation granting space operators 
partial immunity from liability). 
58 See Matthew Schaefer, The Intersection of Insurance Markets and Liability 
Regimes Regarding Third-Parties and Space Flight Participants in Commercial Space 
Activities, 57TH IISL COLLOQUIA OF LAWS OF OUTER SPACE OF THE IISL (2014). 
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will now remain in effect until the end of 2023.59  Instead of gov-
ernment regulations, the FAA worked with industry and NASA to 
issue a non-binding set of guidelines regarding human space 
flight.60 To be sure, there are a few issues that have arisen that 
cause launch companies concern.  For example, the reusable launch 
vehicle regulations were really designed with Shuttle-type vehicles 
in mind and instead it is operational reusablilty (i.e. reuse of first 
stages) that is occurring first and so the current regulations are not 
a perfect fit and require issuing a number of different waivers.61  
Another issue that will likely arise as the small launch vehicle sec-
tor grows is a potential licensing bottleneck if each individual 
launch is treated as an individual activity.62 
Overall, the launch licensing process falls within a range of the 
continuum that qualifies as permissionless innovation, and even 
goes to the extent of incentivized permissionless innovation.  In 
other words, approval is required for these activities but is essen-
tially never denied, and the government has used resources and 
space act agreements to incentivize development of the launch sec-
tor. 
When accidents occur, the government works with the private 
sector under the companies’ own FAA-approved accident investi-
gation plan to promptly resume activity.63  New reentry technolo-
gies for first stage boosters are facilitated.  Launch companies can 
operate vehicles under both an experimental permit and a launch 
license.64  Companies are indemnified by the government for any 
massive third-party damage caused by a space launch, and they 
are also protected from negligence and gross negligence claims 
                                                      
59 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, supra note 51, § 
111 (outlining a regulatory framework relevant to standards and extension of 
certain safety regulation requirements). 
60 FAA, RECOMMENDED PRACTICE FOR HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT OCCUPANT SAFETY 
(2014) (“The purpose of this document is to provide a compilation of practices that 
the [FAA] believes are important and recommends for commercial human space 
flight occupant safety.”). 
61 Discussions at 10th Annual University of Nebraska Washington D.C. Space 
Law Conference, Sept. 15, 2017. 
62 See id. 
63 See FAA, FACT SHEET—COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION ACTIVITIES 
(2017) (“The FAA requires commercial operators to file an investigation plan that 
meets FAA regulations and contains the operator’s procedures for reporting and 
responding to launch accidents, launch incidents, or other mishaps that may 
occur. The FAA approves and oversees compliance with these plans.”). 
64 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, supra note 51, § 107. 
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from those aboard the spacecraft.65  Regulation of design features 
to protect occupants is not allowed (at least, for an initial period), 
but industry standards (or government–industry standards) are 
encouraged. 
Thus, the approach to launch licensing and human spaceflight 
meets many of the principles espoused by permissionless innova-
tion proponents: pushing for self-regulation, waiting for insurance 
markets to address problems, promoting education to minimize 
risks, relying on existing legal regimes including the common law 
of torts, reducing the immediate constraining impact of existing 
tort regimes, and adopting targeted, limited legal measures. 
 
3.2.  Permissionless Innovation and NOAA Licensing of Remote 
Sensing Satellites 
 
Unlike FAA’s launch licensing regime and commercial human 
space flight regulations, the remote National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) sensing licensing regime 
under the Department of Commerce is never referred to in the 
press or by industry as an example of permissionless innovation 
thinking.  The National and Commercial Space Programs,66 in es-
sence the slightly updated version of the 1992 Land Remote Sens-
ing Policy Act,67 states that “no person that is subject to the juris-
diction or control of the United States may . . . operate any private 
remote sensing space system without a license.”68 
                                                      
65 14 C.F.R. § 440.17(b) (2016) (“The licensee . . . shall implement a reciprocal 
waiver of claims . . . under which each party waives and releases claims against all 
the other parties to the waiver and agrees to assume financial responsibility for 
property damage it sustains and for bodily injury or property damage sustained 
by its own employees, and to hold harmless and indemnify each other from 
bodily injury or property damage sustained by its employees, resulting from a 
licensed or permitted activity, regardless of fault.” (emphasis added)); Schaefer, 
supra note 45, at 246 (“There is a statutory exception for ‘willful misconduct’ to the 
waivers of liability, and the FAA has interpreted this language to mean that the 
waivers prevent claims based on negligence as well as gross negligence claims.”). 
66 See generally Act of Dec. 18, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-314, 124 Stat. 3328 
(codifying existing laws related to national and commercial space programs). 
67 See generally Land Remote Sending Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, 
106 Stat. 4163 (establishing a new national land remote sensing policy, among 
other purposes). 
68 Act of Dec. 18, 2010, supra note 64, § 60122(a). 
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Federal regulations define a remote sensing system to mean 
any satellite or system that “is capable of actively or passively sens-
ing the Earth’s surface.”69  Over the past several years, this provi-
sion has been interpreted literally to account for all satellites capa-
ble of Earth-imaging.  This interpretation is in response to concerns 
over the proliferation of high-resolution imagery of high-value na-
tional security and diplomatic targets especially in the wake of a 
significant relaxation of the resolution limitations on commercial 
remote sensing imagery.  Under this interpretation and with 
changes in space technology, the number of licenses NOAA is tak-
ing under consideration has grown considerably—a phenomenon 
described as an “explosion” by NOAA officials.70  All license appli-
cations must also be reviewed by the Department of Defense, the 
Department of the Interior, the Department of State, and the 
broader intelligence community to address their singular con-
cerns.71 
Once granted, licensees must operate systems in a way so as to 
preserve U.S. national security, foreign policy, and international 
obligations.  Moreover, licensees must maintain operational control 
from within the U.S., maintain records of operations, limit collec-
tion and dissemination of data as required, notify NOAA of for-
eign agreements to capture or sell imagery, report deviations and 
anomalies, make data available to the Department of Interior, dis-
pose of the system in a manner approved by NOAA, and submit a 
data protection plan.  NOAA conducts audits at various stages and 
requires reports to ensure compliance with laws, regulations, and 
license conditions.72  In the event of noncompliance, NOAA is au-
thorized to revoke the license and suspend all sales of imagery cap-
tured by the system in question.73 
                                                      
69 15 C.F.R. § 960.3 (2017). 
70 Alan Robinson, NOAA, NOAA’S COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING 
REGULATORY AFFAIRS (2016). 
71 See Glenn Tallia, NOAA’s Licensing of CubeSats as Private Remote Sensing 
Space Systems Under the National and Commercial Space Policy Act (2012), AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION (Jan. 20, 2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/science_techno
logy/1_20_12_licensing.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS8E-9MN7] 
(describing, inter alia, general license conditions relevant to NOAA’s licensing of 
cubesats as private remote sensing space systems). 
72 Id. 
73 See 15 C.F.R. § 960.15 (2013) (listing penalties and sanctions if a licensee 
substantially failed to comply with Title II of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act 
of 1992 (15 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.) (Pub. L. No. 102–555, 106 Stat. 4163)). 
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Two of the major challenges facing remote sensing licensing are 
the proliferation of small satellites—as well as the corresponding 
increase in license applications74—and some high-profile delays in 
licensing decisions.75  Indeed, the proliferation of small satellites 
creates a unique issue for NOAA license reviewers.  First, while 
many of the small satellites are technically capable of sensing the 
Earth, they generally pose no serious national security or diplomat-
ic concerns.  Additionally, many small satellites are not technologi-
cally capable of complying with orders from the Secretary of 
Commerce to limit collection or dissemination of such imagery.  
Together with increasingly long waits for license decisions, these 
issues are creating pressure for licensure process reform. 
Some suggest that re-interpreting the “capable of” language to 
mean those satellites that will be designed and operated to image 
the Earth could significantly alleviate the burden of license review.  
Others suggest a green light “presumptive” licensing test, where-
by, although the government is given a certain amount of time to 
deny a license, an acceptance is assumed.  There is always the risk, 
though, that interagency gridlock will remain a barrier to a speedy 
process.  Moreover, some believe that small satellites are not so in-
nocuous; ideas for a constellation of satellites capable of taking im-
agery of the same point on the surface multiple times a day, com-
bined with high-level data analytics, pose potential serious 
national security and foreign policy issues. 
House Science Committee members have expressed frustration 
that NOAA is not meeting deadlines for licensing decisions.76  Law 
requires a decision within 120 days, but, in some high profile cases 
involving major companies and systems, decisions have taken over 
                                                      
74 See, e.g., Jeff Foust, Smallsat Constellations Spark Investor Interest, Regulator 
Concerns, SPACENEWS (Mar. 24, 2015), http://spacenews.com/smallsat-
constellations-spark-investor-interest-regulator-concerns/ 
[https://perma.cc/GP4R-6ZW6] (“Small satellites have already been constituting 
a significant part of the FCC’s workload on the licensing side . . . . There has been 
every indication that this workload is going to continue to increase.”). 
75 See, e.g., COMM. ON SCI., SPACE & TECH., SMITH, BABIN QUESTION NOAA’S 
DELAY OF SATELLITE IMAGERY PROVIDER’S LICENSE (June 6, 2016) (“[C]ommercial 
satellite imagery provider DigitalGlobe is still awaiting a license approval to 
sell . . . imagery data . . . almost three years after submitting the initial request, 
well beyond the 120 day requirement.”). 
76 See id. (“NOAA regulations state that the agency must give a reason for 
[delays] and an estimate of when its review will be completed . . . [T]he 
Committee would also like to know what has caused the delay in this application 
and when NOAA anticipates this licensing action will be closed out.”). 
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three years.77  For example, Digital Globe, the largest provider of 
imagery to the U.S. government, waited over three years for a deci-
sion on its Worldview 3 satellite.78  Some of the concern stems from 
the fact that these delays might lead to outsourcing of the remote 
sensing business to foreign countries.  There are recent efforts 
within the Executive Branch in the form of a new interagency 
Memorandum of Understanding to improve the process and avoid 
lengthy delays,79 but Congress is considering more significant re-
forms.80 
Unlike the launch licensing regime, the remote sensing licens-
ing process currently does not seem to be driven by permissionless 
innovation thinking.  Permission is not de jure or de facto the default 
position.  Long overdue decisions and missed deadlines hold up 
projects without transparency in the decision-making, and without 
an opportunity to cure defects, through discussions pertaining to 
alternatives.  It is understandable—given national security con-
cerns—that reliance is not placed on industry self-regulation, in-
surance markets, or “educate and empower” solutions. 
Yet, efforts to enhance timely decisions, transparency of ration-
ales in decision-making, and the opportunity to cure defects would 
be improvements, as would the elaboration of an updated benefit-
cost analysis over national security concerns.  For example, a two-
tiered approach to licensing could be considered—one for cube 
satellites unlikely to have the technology to raise national security 
concerns (e.g., more akin to obtaining a driver’s license) and one 
for larger, more sophisticated satellites.  More generally, decision-
makers in the interagency process may need to update benefit-cost 
analyses by considering whether the proliferation of remote sens-
ing satellites globally (as well as other methods for deriving infor-
                                                      
77 See id. (referring explicitly to a “120 day requirement”). 
78 Id. (“DigitalGlobe is still awaiting a license approval . . . almost three years 
after submitting the initial request.”). 
79 See Jeff Foust, NGA Director Supports Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory 
Reform, SPACENEWS (Aug. 8, 2017), http://spacenews.com/nga-director-supports-
commercial-remote-sensing-regulatory-reform/ [https://perma.cc/4BXJ-8684] 
(“[T]he Departments of State, Defense, Commerce and Interior, as well as the 
intelligence community, have updated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
regarding [NOAA’s] interagency review.”). 
80 See American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 
115th Cong. (2017) (proposing an amendment “to title 51, United States Code, to 
provide for the authorization and supervision of nongovernmental space 
activities, and for other purposes.”). 
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mation) make restrictions on U.S. commercial remote sensing com-
panies a detriment to U.S. competitiveness without corresponding 
increases in U.S. national security.  The remote sensing licensing 
regime highlights that permissionless innovation is a frame of 
mind that must permeate policy-makers in the interagency discus-
sions of applications.  This latter element is why we might think of 
the creation of an esprit de corps of permissionless innovation 
thinking in interagency discussions. 
 
 
3.3.  Permissionless Innovation and FCC Licensing of Spectrum 
 
Numerous spectrum battles and controversies arise out of new 
space technologies and business models, including: controversies 
connected to potential large increases in the number of launches, 
disputes between potential LEO and existing GEO satellite opera-
tors,81 competition amongst the various LEO satellite proposals,82 
competition between terrestrial 5G wireless demands and satel-
lites,83 and the potential increase in the use of optical communica-
tions (laser) in satellite plans.84  There are few legislative proposals 
that touch on these controversies that are being handled through 
FCC proceedings.  Spectrum battles tend to be resolved in an area 
of the regulatory continuum quite far from the purest forms of 
permissionless innovation.  Due to the limited nature of spectrum 
                                                      
81 See, e.g., Peter B. de Selding, One Web Fails (At Least for Now) to Soothe 
Satellite Interference Fears, SPACENEWS, Sept. 18, 2015, 
http://spacenews.com/oneweb-fails-at-least-for-now-to-soothe-satellite-
interference-fears/ [https://perma.cc/S8A6-WFDM] (mentioning the potential 
issues to current and future satellites by increasing the number of LEO and GEO 
satellite systems). 
82 See, e.g., Klint Finley, Internet by Satellite is a Space Race with No Winners, 
WIRED, June 12, 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/06/elon-musk-space-x-
satellite-internet/ [https://perma.cc/7KR5-FKRC] (detailing that competition 
between OneWeb and SpaceX in their race to provide internet to rural 
populations). 
83 See, e.g., Peter B. de Selding, FCC Chairman to Satellite Industry: Shut Up, 
SPACENEWS MAG., Aug. 1, 2016, https://www.spacenewsmag.com/the-bottom-
line/fcc-chairman-to-satellite-industry-shut-up/ [https://perma.cc/2D82-
WHML] (stating that the FCC Chairman discouraged criticism of the 5G FCC 
ruling). 
84 See Finley, supra note 82 (noting that SpaceX applied to the FCC to begin 
testing). 
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and the potential for interference from overlapping spectrum uses, 
spectrum allocations require heavy ex ante government involve-
ment in most instances.  Communications satellites, due to the ex-
pensive capital investment, must have dedicated, licensed spec-
trum to justify the business case.  Additionally, a GEO satellite will 
need the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to allocate 
the orbital slot and frequency for the satellite, but importantly ITU 
permission is usually provided on a first-come, first-served basis.85  
Similar to use of permissionless innovation arguments by the two 
competing sides in the net neutrality debate in the cyber domain, 
in many of the space and satellite examples detailed below permis-
sionless innovation might be advocated for by those with compet-
ing interests.  As in the case of the net neutrality debate, providing 
greater permissionless innovation for one party’s interest in the 
space domain concerning spectrum may negatively impact the 
ability for the competing technology or business model to engage 
in permissionless innovation. 
 
3.3.1.  Spectrum for An Increased Number and Cadence of 
Commercial Launches   
 
Concern is growing that increased launches from the United 
States may create further procedural bottlenecks and administra-
tive burdens with respect to spectrum needed for commercial 
space launch activities.  Currently, spectrum for launch vehicles is 
allocated under special temporary authority by the FCC on the ba-
sis of experimental authorizations.  The spectrum allocated is fed-
eral spectrum and can only be used on a non-interference basis.86  
This concern over administrative burdens in obtaining spectrum 
                                                      
85 See, e.g., FRANS VON DER DUNK, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITE 
COMMUNICATIONS, HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 475–84 (VON DER DUNK & TRONCHETTI 
eds., 2015); FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 236–39 (2009) 
(noting some reforms of the ITU’s first-come, first-served approach); Lawrence D. 
Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and the International 
Telecommunications Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1111–14 (2000) (noting the 
problems of the ITU regulatory regime with regard to geostationary satellites); 
Patrick S. Ryan, The ITU and the Internet’s Titanic Moment, 8 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 
85–86 (2012) (discussing the history of the ITU and the differences between the 
ITU’s past regulatory subjects and the internet). 
86 FCC, DA 13-446, GUIDANCE ON OBTAINING EXPERIMENTAL AUTHORIZATIONS 
FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES, (2013). 
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for space launch vehicles is reflected in Rep. Bridenstine’s pro-
posed Space Renaissance Act (HR4945) in Section 309(h).  The bill 
calls upon the FCC and Department of Commerce to ensure the 
process for obtaining authorization to use spectrum for a space 
launch is “standardized and clearly defined” and to “minimize the 
number and complexity of such authorizations required per launch 
mission.”87  In light of its goal of assured access to spectrum for 
commercial launches it also calls for the allocation of spectrum of 
launch activities on a “co-primary, interference-protected basis.”88 
 
3.3.2.  Spectrum Battles Arising from LEO Satellite Constellations 
 
Numerous companies have plans at various stages for large 
constellations of LEO satellites to provide broadband internet and 
other services.  There are concerns in at least certain portions of the 
globe that the LEO systems could cause interference with existing 
GEO systems.89  Such concerns are exacerbated by the growing 
number of LEO satellite business plans being developed.90 
Concerns exist that “spectrum warehousing” or “paper satel-
lite” strategies may occur through the use of foreign telecom ad-
ministrations to delay or block the most likely LEO satellite con-
stellations and systems.  More specifically, there are concerns that 
the ease of acquiring spectrum rights through some foreign admin-
istrations’ requests to the ITU can create “false competitors who 
are out to impede . . . serious space companies.”91  Possible reforms 
                                                      
87 American Space Renaissance Act, H.R. Res. 4945, 114th Cong. § 309(h) 
(2016) 
88 Id. 
89 See Jeff Faust, Low Earth Orbit Constellations Could Pose Interference Risk to 
GEO Satellites, SPACENEWS, Oct. 25, 2015, http://spacenews.com/low-earth-orbit-
constellations-could-pose-interference-risk-to-geo-satellites/ 
[https://perma.cc/GMQ4-F66X] (noting that even if new satellites comply with 
ITU rules they can cause problems for newer and more sensitive satellites). 
90 See, e.g., Alan Boyle, 5G or not 5G? Boeing Joins the Battle Over Broadband 
Satellite Spectrum, GEEKWIRE, June 23, 2016, 
http://www.geekwire.com/2016/boeing-battle-broadband-internet-satellite/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z6G3-AZJ4] (stating that Boeing plans to put over 1,000 
satellites into low Earth orbit). 
91 See, e.g., Jason Koebler, SpaceX Warns Fake Competitors Could Disrupt Its 
Space Internet Plan, MOTHERBOARD, Mar. 9, 2015, 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bmj34d/spacex-warns-paper-
satellites-could-disrupt-its-space-internet-plan [https://perma.cc/JG33-E3M2] 
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within the ITU include increasing the number of satellites that 
must be launched and operated within a set number of years and 
creating milestones for contracting and constructing satellites to 
better distinguish between “paper satellites” and genuine endeav-
ors.92  Issues are also raised regarding the interaction between the 
FCC and ITU approaches.  The current FCC approach is to use a 
processing round procedure for LEO satellite spectrum applica-
tions in contrast to the first-come, first-served approach for GEO 
satellite spectrum allocations through the ITU. 
 
3.3.3.  Spectrum Battles Between Satellite and Terrestrial 5G 
 
Recently departed FCC Chairman Wheeler leaned hard on the 
satellite industry to cooperate with potential future 5G terrestrial 
users of 28GHz spectrum on potential sharing of that spectrum.93  
At ITU’s World Radio Conference in 2015 (WRC-15), the satellite 
industry successfully defended their 28GHz rights; however this 
frustrated the FCC, which was looking for more willingness for a 
study on possible sharing of the spectrum with terrestrial 5G users 
in the band.94  It appears, regardless of what happens international-
ly—WRC-19 will likely re-examine the issues—that the U.S. is go-
ing to be seeking spectrum sharing in the 28GHz band, although 
new FCC Chairman Pai has not yet addressed the issue in detail.95 
                                                      
92 See Faust, supra note 89 (“[S]ome raised questions about another aspect of 
ITU rules regarding NGSO systems. Current regulations consider an NGSO 
system to be brought into use, and its frequency rights confirmed, when the first 
satellite of a constellation is launched, regardless of the number of satellites in the 
constellation. ‘This makes sense when you have a constellation of 10 or 12 
satellites,’ said Jose Albuquerque, chief of the satellite division of the Federal 
Communication Commission’s International Bureau. ‘But when you’re talking 
about constellations of 800 or 4,000 satellites, you cannot acquire rights by 
bringing one satellite into service.’”); On the issue of paper satellites, see generally 
Von der Dunk, supra note 85, at 485–87; Lyall & Larson, supra note 85, at 236–39. 
93 See de Selding, supra note 14 (noting that Chairman Wheeler advocated 
studying the possibility of sharing the 28GHz spectrum at the World 
Radiocommunication Conference). 
94 Id. 
95 See Caleb Henry, Trump’s FCC Chairman Favors Simpler Satellite Licensing 
Rules, SPACENEWS, Jan. 24, 2017, http://spacenews.com/trumps-fcc-chairman-
favors-simpler-satellite-licensing-rules/ [https://perma.cc/T9JW-EUTN] (noting 
the appointment of FCC chairman Ajit Pai and his desire to close the digital 
divide as well as state he has not made clear how satellites will fit into his 
broadband goal). 
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Separately, a coalition of 5G terrestrial broadband companies in 
June 2016 petitioned the FCC to remove 500MHz of Ku-band (be-
tween 12.2 GHz and 12.7 GHz) that currently gives priority access 
to LEO satellite internet constellations.96  Sharing within the Ku-
band between 5G and LEO satellites will not be possible, but shar-
ing with direct broadcast GEO satellite signals in the band with 5G 
users may be possible, although this is also in dispute.97 
 
3.3.4.  Possibility of Laser Communications  
 
Some new satellite ideas may seek to use laser communications 
to avoid the need for spectrum rights, particularly for inter-satellite 
communications.  Laser communications98 have the potential bene-
fit of a faster and higher capacity movement of data than RF com-
munications.99  However, laser communications have unique fea-
tures that must overcome challenges like cloud cover, turbulence, 
and other atmospheric disturbances.100  NASA has already demon-
strated the technology for Moon-Earth communications and is pro-
ceeding with space-to-space and space-to-ground applications.101  
Space optical communications are currently unregulated, and there 
                                                      
96 See Peter B. de Selding, Dish Network Battles OneWeb and SpaceX for Ku-Band 
Spectrum Rights, SPACENEWS, June 9, 2016, http://spacenews.com/dish-network-
battles-oneweb-and-spacex-for-ku-band-spectrum-rights/. 
[https://perma.cc/8AKU-EDK4] (detailing that Dish Network and other 
companies asked U.S. regulators to strip certain satellites of their priority access to 
500 MHz of Ku-band spectrum). 
97 Id. 
98 See, e.g., Nicholas Gerbis, How Laser Communication Works, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS, Feb. 24, 2017, http://science.howstuffworks.com/laser-
communication.htm [https://perma.cc/T7QY-AG66] (describing how laser 
technology works). 
99 See, e.g., Donald Cornwell, Space-Based Laser Communications Break 
Threshold, OPTICS & PHOTONICS NEWS, May 2016, http://www.osa-
opn.org/home/articles/volume_27/may_2016/features/space-
based_laser_communications_break_threshold/ [https://perma.cc/HJA6-
AMM3] (stating that satellite lasers can communicate at “[i]nternet-like speeds.”). 
100 Id. 
101 See NASA, Laser Demonstration Reveals Bright Future for Space 
Communications, NASA, Dec. 23, 2103, 
https://www.nasa.gov/content/goddard/laser-demonstration-reveals-bright-
future-for-space-communication [https://perma.cc/B3MM-R9LQ] (noting that 
lunar laser communication missions have revealed the possibility of expanding 
capabilities in space laser communications). 
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is a debate as to what extent the FCC could exercise authority over 
lasers.102  However, questions of interference could embolden the 
FCC to fill the void. 
 
3.3.5.  Summary  
 
Technology development that needs or concerns licensed spec-
trum—and the satellite business demands the certainty of licensed 
spectrum—due to its limited, finite nature—will always involve a 
good deal of ex ante government permissions from both the FCC 
and the ITU.  Whether it is additional more certain spectrum for 
the increased cadence of space launches, new large constellation 
LEO satellite plans, terrestrial 5G wireless intrusions into high fre-
quency satellite spectrum, or even laser communication proposals, 
the FCC and ITU will be rather heavily involved on the regulatory 
front.  For GEO systems, orbital slots and allocations are largely 
first-come, first-served rewarding first-moving innovators.  For 
LEO systems, the FCC conducts a processing round seeking to ac-
commodate interests of both first-movers and those that soon after 
also declare interest and the ITU regulates interference issues to a 
degree.  Resorting to industry self-regulation, insurance markets, 
common law (of torts), and educate and empower solutions are 
largely avoided given the dynamics, although there are some ele-
ments that encourage cooperation among competing industries in 
the 5G terrestrial versus satellite situation rather than the govern-
ment imposing a solution. 
 
4.  PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION FOR NEW ON-ORBIT ACTIVITIES:  
THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION LIMIT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
LIMIT, AND THE INVESTOR CERTAINTY LIMIT 
 
Thus, for traditional space activities we observe a range of regu-
latory models: 1) an FAA launch and reentry and human space 
flight framework that certainly is closest to the permissionless in-
                                                      
102 See generally Joel Thayer, Lasering in on the Federal Communications 
Commission: Can the FCC Regulate Laser Communications, 6 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. 
BRIEF 99–128 (2015) (arguing the FCC does have authority under current law to 
regulate laser communications and is the proper agency to regulate them). 
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novation ideal; 2) a NOAA remote sensing regime that is perhaps 
overbroad, impacting innovative small satellite ideas, and that 
struggles with establishing a permissionless innovation esprit de 
corps in the interagency process as participants have yet to fully 
reassess benefit-cost analysis of national security concerns in an 
environment where foreign remote sensing systems are increasing-
ly sophisticated; and 3) an FCC spectrum licensing regime that by 
necessity, given the properties of spectrum and the demands of the 
satellite business case, must have significant ex ante government 
involvement.  All those regulatory models are long-established and 
will take considerable effort to change. 
In contrast, regulating new on-orbit space activities begins with 
a relatively clean slate.  There is no formal regulatory framework in 
place, although the government has leveraged its launch licensing 
authority, especially its payload review prong, to a degree to par-
tially fill the gap.  The only other exception to this clean slate is that 
for well over a decade NOAA and the FCC have imposed debris 
mitigation requirements on licensees—presumably relying on their 
“public interest” authority to do so—although some believe even 
this limited on-orbit regulation constitutes “competence creep.”103  
Staunch permissionless innovation advocates might say this essen-
tially clean slate is a victory and should be maintained.  In essence, 
companies are free to conduct new on-orbit activities if they so 
choose, and the government need not authorize those activities, 
nor may the government prohibit those activities.  In fact, permis-
sionless innovation advocates might say this is almost an ideal sce-
nario, in that the current state of affairs achieves (near) pure or un-
adulterated permissionless innovation.  However, the irony is that 
the benefits of permissionless innovation will not be achieved in 
this (nearly) pure state. 
There are at least three major risks to allowing calls for a pure 
or unadulterated permissionless innovation regulatory model with 
respect to new on-orbit activities.  First, it is very clear that U.S. in-
ternational obligations require “authorization” of and the provi-
sion of “continuing” supervision, by the government of commer-
cial activities in outer space.  Thus, any pure version of 
permissionless innovation would run afoul of U.S. international 
obligations in the primary space treaty, the Outer Space Treaty.  
Second, with the national security implications of many space ac-
                                                      
103 See von der Dunk, supra note 34, at 171–73. 
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tivities, it is unrealistic to expect adoption of a pure permissionless 
innovation regulatory model to govern such activities; the industry 
largely recognizes this dynamic.  Third, a large number of busi-
nesses and investors in the space sector seek a minimal amount of 
regulation to ensure a transparent framework for approval of their 
on-orbit activities so that regulatory uncertainty and foreign hostil-
ity to their activities is minimized.104  For each of these reasons, a 
failure by Congress to create explicit “light touch” authorization 
and supervision authority in an Executive Branch agency will ac-
tually defeat the purposes of permissionless innovation. 
Of course, the Executive Branch will have incentives to contin-
ue to leverage its payload review authority to try to ensure that 
U.S. international obligations are met and that U.S. national securi-
ty is not endangered, and to give companies and their investors a 
degree of regulatory approval and certainty they desire.  Chairman 
Babin and former FAA officials have argued that because the 
OST’s Article VI is not a self-executing international obligation, 
and thus not automatically part of the U.S. legal system, the Ad-
ministration cannot seek to authorize or supervise new on-orbit 
space activities unless Congress passes a law delegating authoriza-
tion and supervision responsibility to the Executive Branch.105  This 
may well be true but the situation is slightly more complex.  Con-
gress has already delegated payload review authority to the FAA, 
                                                      
104 See Marcia Smith, Bridenstine: This is Our Sputnik Moment & the Moon Will 
Ensure U.S. Preeminence in Space, SPACEPOLICYONLINE (Nov. 2, 2016 12:00 AM), 
http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/bridenstine-this-is-our-sputnik-
moment-the-moon-will-ensure-u-s-preeminence-in-space. 
[https://perma.cc/PR4Q-VMF4] (explaining that a significant private investment 
in space could be stopped by the U.S. State Department due to actions and 
protests in foreign countries). 
105 See Babin, supra note 2 (“The previous Administration failed to remember 
that the Outer Space Treaty is not self-executing. The executive branch, unless 
explicitly authorized by Congress, should not deny an American citizen the right 
to explore and use Outer Space.”); See also Laura Montgomery, Article VI of the 
Outer Space Treaty is not Self-Executing and Should Not be Treated as an Obstacle to 
Private Space Activity, GROUND BASED SPACE MATTERS (Oct. 14, 2016), 
http://groundbasedspacematters.com/index.php/2016/10/14/article-vi-is-not-
self-executing-and-should-not-be-treated-as-an-obstacle-to-private-space-activity/ 
[https://perma.cc/KW4P-4FYH] (“[N]ot all provisions of the Outer Space Treaty 
are self-executing, so until Congress acts, those treaty provisions don’t bind 
private operators. That logic applies to the treaty’s Article VI as well.”). 
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and a factor to consider under a payload review is U.S. interna-
tional obligations.106 
One might argue ensuring no violation of international obliga-
tions (self-executing or not) is thus an objective the FAA can con-
sider in a payload review.  However, the counterpoint is that the 
Executive Branch lacks the power to consider international obliga-
tion compliance for on-orbit activities because Congress, when 
granting re-entry licensing authority in 1997, indicated it did not 
want to grant on-orbit authority at that time.107  This places the U.S. 
Executive Branch in a difficult position—the Hobbesian choice of 
complying with international obligations or acting consistently 
with apparent Congressional intent. 
Similarly, space businesses—the innovators—are also put in a 
poor position.  They could simply seek to pursue any on-orbit ac-
tivity they like, and then pursue litigation if the Executive Branch 
blocks an activity that, for example, the government believes 
would violate U.S. international obligations or endanger U.S. na-
tional security.  The “pursue and litigate” strategy is not an attrac-
tive option for many space companies.  Litigation consumes time 
and money, and global competitors may advance during that time.  
Additionally, the dynamics of the space business are such that the 
government is always a considerable part of the customer base, 
and suing one’s customer is not necessarily an attractive option.  If 
the U.S. Executive Branch chooses the alternate path and stands 
down by not blocking the activity nor authorizing it, then space 
businesses, particularly those involved with international partners 
or an international customer base, would need to worry about po-
tential foreign government actions for failure by the U.S. govern-
ment to meet international obligations.  For example, a foreign 
government might block cooperation by a partner or prevent cus-
tomers in its territory from purchasing goods or services connected 
with the activity.  That is why on-orbit businesses have been 
“knocking on the door” of various agencies, including the State 
Department, the last several years, in essence asking who will give 
them a stamp of approval.  It is an uncertain process currently—
                                                      
106 See 14 C.F.R. § 415.51 (2016) (stating that the FAA reviews payloads for 
adherence to “U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, . . . international 
obligations of the United States . . . [and] safety requirements.”). 
107 See H.R. REP. NO. 105–347 (1997) (noting that a license is not required for 
an “on-orbit operation” completed “after a launch . . . and before reentry[.]”). 
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one that U.S. space businesses desire to be made certain and trans-
parent. 
We explore each of these three risks—international obligation 
risk, national security risk, and regulatory uncertainty risk—below, 
with particular emphasis on meeting U.S. international obligations.  
Particular emphasis is placed on meeting U.S. international obliga-
tions because it appears that a drive for a (nearly) pure form of 
permissionless innovation is leading to misguided treaty interpre-
tations of the Outer Space Treaty that do not respect long-standing 
rules of treaty interpretation binding the United States and consti-
tutes a development that can damage U.S. interests in other treaty 
regimes too.  The analysis below reveals that the U.S. Congress can 
establish an authorization regime that meets U.S. international ob-
ligations, allows the U.S. government to protect national security, 
and provides regulatory certainty for U.S. space business investors, 
while at the same time achieving the benefits, and retaining the es-
sence, of permissionless innovation thinking. 
 
4.1.  International Obligation Risk 
 
The United States currently has a regulatory gap pertaining to 
on-orbit activities that occur between launch and reentry by its 
commercial actors.  Outside of spectrum use (already requiring an 
FCC license), systems capable of sensing the Earth (already requir-
ing a NOAA license), and debris mitigation requirements imposed 
by those agencies, on-orbit activities are not regulated or separately 
authorized.  This gap creates compliance issues with U.S. interna-
tional obligations under Article VI of the OST.  Proof of five propo-
sitions is necessary to establish that such a gap violates U.S. inter-
national obligations and that complying with those obligations by 
filling the gap will not require any wholesale abandonment of 
permissionless innovation thinking.  The five propositions are as 
follows: 
(1)  The OST requires the U.S. government to “authorize” 
and provide “continuing supervision” of its commercial 
actors’ space activities, at least in part in order to ensure 
compliance with OST provisions; 
(2)  Ensuring compliance with OST obligations by its com-
mercial actors only requires minimal, light touch regu-
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lation because OST obligations are few in number, 
many do not implicate commercial plans, and those that 
do are minimally constraining; 
(3)  Congress made clear in the legislative history to the 
1998 amendments to U.S. commercial space legislation 
that outside of FCC and NOAA licensing regimes for 
spectrum use and remote sensing, respectively, it was 
not granting authority to FAA or any other federal 
agency to regulate on-orbit activities; 
(4)  There are limits to how far the FAA can stretch or uti-
lize its existing payload review process to address on-
orbit issues; and 
(5)  Current FCC authority and NOAA authority does not 
allow the United States to ensure compliance by com-
mercial actors with OST obligations. 
 
Proof of Proposition #1 
 
Let’s start with my first claim, specifically that the OST requires 
the U.S. government to authorize and provide continuing supervi-
sion of its commercial space activities, in part to ensure compliance 
with OST provisions by its commercial actors.  To begin, let’s cover 
some basics of international law.  Most international law applies to 
States (governments) but not to private actors directly.  This is true 
of the vast majority of customary international law and most trea-
ties. 
There are, of course, some exceptions.  Rules against piracy and 
genocide apply to private actors in customary international law.108  
Some treaties, such as the Montreal Convention,109 which lays out 
rules for air carriers, and private international law conventions, 
                                                      
108 See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Corporate Liability Under Customary International 
Law, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1045, 1047–8 (2012) (stating that piracy and genocide are 
punishable against private actors). 
109 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage 
by Air, Nov. 4, 2003, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22001A0718(01):EN:HTML 
[https://perma.cc/AN8Y-3Z3B]. 
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like the Convention on International Sale of Goods (CISG),110 apply 
to private actors, although in the case of CISG parties can contract 
to opt-out of its provisions.  But these are exceptions to the general 
rule. 
Like most international law, the OST does not apply directly to 
private actors.  Its obligations do not say “States Parties and their 
nationals shall . . . . “  All of its requirements apply to “State Par-
ties.”  For this reason, arguments are made that OST obligations do 
not apply to private, commercial actors at all.  In an attempt to but-
tress this argument, proponents of this view point out that the 
drafters of the OST showed they knew how to make obligations 
applicable to nationals by directly saying so.111  The proponents of 
this view point to Article IX of the OST where it says the following: 
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an ac-
tivity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would 
cause potentially harmful interference with activities of 
other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of 
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
it shall undertake appropriate international consultations 
before proceeding with any such activity or experi-
ment . . . .112 
However, this obligation, like all others in the OST, only ap-
plies directly to State Parties.  There is no obligation imposed on 
nationals of State Parties to consult with anyone.  The obligation is 
on a State Party to consult when it or one of its nationals is plan-
ning an activity that would cause potentially harmful interference 
with activities of other States Parties.  A State Party will presuma-
bly be aware of its national’s activities in outer space because un-
der Article VI State Parties must authorize and provide continuing 
supervision of their nationals’ space activities. 
                                                      
110 See generally  
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 
11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [https://perma.cc/6DEN-A55L]. 
111 See Laura Montgomery, Planetary Protection and Its Applicability to the 
Private Sector, GROUND BASED SPACE MATTERS (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://groundbasedspacematters.com/index.php/2016/10/03/planetary-
protection-and-its-applicability-to-the-private-sector/#more-133 
[https://perma.cc/543X-PBJ8] (“When the drafters of the treaty intended a 
particular provision to apply to non-governmental entities they said so.”). 
112 OST, supra note 16, Art. IX (emphasis added). 
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In fact, Article VI goes further and contains a unique rule, one 
not found in virtually any other treaty, that pure permissionless 
innovation-inspired treaty interpretation ignores or misreads.  Ar-
ticle VI provides: 
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsi-
bility for national activities in outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are 
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental 
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out 
in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.  
The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require 
authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate 
State Party to the Treaty . . . .113 
Before we examine these provisions, it is useful to address the 
issue of state responsibility in international law more generally.  
The ILC Articles on State Responsibility provide in its first two ar-
ticles the following: 
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the in-
ternational responsibility of that State.114 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when 
conduct consisting of an action or omission: 
(a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and 
(b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State.115 
Thus, for international responsibility to be incurred by a State, 
there needs to be an act or omission attributable to the State under 
international law and a breach of an international obligation.  Arti-
cle VI of the OST indicates that States Parties are internationally re-
sponsible for national activities in space, even when they are car-
ried on by its commercial actors, and State Parties are also directed 
by Article VI to assure that national activities, including those by 
its commercial actors, are carried out in conformity with the provi-
                                                      
113 Id. Art. VI (emphasis added). 
114 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 65-70 (2001). 
115 Id. art. 2. 
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sions set forth in the OST.  Thus, if a U.S. commercial entity does 
something that would run counter to an OST obligation, the United 
States would bear international responsibility for that violation.116 
Normally, under international law, private party activity is on-
ly attributable to the State where the State directs or assumes effec-
tive control over the activity.  For example, in the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility, Article 8 states: 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be con-
sidered an act of a State under international law if the per-
son or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions 
of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying 
out the conduct.117 
But the first sentence of Article VI makes States Parties to the 
OST internationally responsible, even when they do not meet the 
direction or control test.  To be sure, the OST Article VI’s second 
sentence requires “authorization” and “continuing supervision” by 
a State party over its commercial actors’ space activities, but it is 
unlikely that that level of involvement alone would meet the ILC 
Article 8 standard.  In any event, the first sentence of Article VI, 
which makes State Parties internationally responsible, eliminates 
the need to answer that question definitively. 
Article VI also requires States Parties to “authorize” and pro-
vide “continuing supervision” for its commercial actors’ space ac-
tivities, at least in part to help assure that its commercial actors 
comply with OST provisions.118  The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) requires interpretation of a treaty based on 
the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in light of its object and purpose.119  While the United States is not a 
party to the VCLT, it does recognize the treaty interpretation rules 
(along with many other rules) in the VCLT as binding as a matter 
                                                      
116 See IRMARD MARBOE, NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE 
LAW 127, 131–34 (von der Dunk & Tronchetti eds., 2015) (noting that States Parties 
to the OST are internationally responsible for outer space activities of non-
governmental entities). 
117 OST, supra note 14, art. 8 (emphasis added). 
118 MARBOE, supra note 114, at 131–32. 
119 See Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
light of its object and purpose.”). 
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of customary international law.120  The first sentence of Article VI 
(referring to assuring conformity) provides context for the “author-
ize” and “continuing supervision” obligation in the second sen-
tence.121  When authorizing and supervising, a State Party is to, at a 
minimum, seek to assure conformity by its commercial space ac-
tors with OST provisions.  The ordinary meaning of ‘authorize’ is 
“give official permission or approval to,” or “to give official per-
mission for something to happen.”122  The ordinary meaning of 
‘supervision’ is to “monitor,” and the ordinary meaning of ‘contin-
uing’ is “occurring in a cyclical or repetitious pattern.”123  In short, 
authorization and continuing supervision require some process to 
“give official permission or approval to,” and “monitor” in some 
“cyclical or repetitious pattern” for the purpose of  assuring that 
commercial actors are complying with OST obligations.  Thus, 
while there is certainly some flexibility in how to implement the 
Article VI obligation, permissionless innovation advocates go too 
far when they claim that “Article VI contains three relevant ambig-
uous terms [(“authorization,” “continuing supervision,” and “ac-
tivities”)] that the drafters appear to have left to different countries 
to define as they see fit . . . .”124  Rather, the drafters undoubtedly 
thought that the treaty, like all other treaties, would be interpreted 
in accordance with internationally binding rules on treaty interpre-
tation as reflected in the VCLT, which was formulated at the same 
time as the Outer Space Treaty—the mid-1960s.  The American 
Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, reported by the House Sci-
ence Committee on June 8, 2017, could be improved by explicitly 
                                                      
120 See U.S. STATE DEP’T, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—TREATIES, 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last accessed Feb. 24, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/T7RH-4YBQ] (“The United States considers many of the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute 
customary international law on the law of treaties.”). 
121 See MARBOE, supra note 114, at 132 n.14 
122 MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, 
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/authorize (last 
accessed Feb. 24, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8WE9-L4QE]. 
123 BUSINESS DICTIONARY, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/continuing.html (last accessed 
Feb. 24, 2017) [https://perma.cc/TFU8-8AR5]. 
124 Laura Montgomery, By the Outer Space Treaty’s Own Terms, The U.S. 
Complies with Article VI, GROUND BASED SPACE MATTERS (Dec. 17, 2016), 
http://groundbasedspacematters.com/index.php/2016/12/17/by-the-outer-
space-treatys-own-terms-the-u-s-complies-with-article-vi-of-the-treaty/#more-245 
[https://perma.cc/ZV8E-EXDW]. 
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acknowledging the VCLT rules when it calls upon the federal gov-
ernment “to interpret . . . its international obligations under the 
Outer Space Treaty in a manner that minimizes regulations and 
limitations on the freedom of United States nongovernmental enti-
ties to explore and use space . . . [and] in a manner that promotes 
free enterprise in space.”125  As we will see in the next section, one 
does not have to stray from VCLT treaty interpretation rules in or-
der to ensure a minimally burdensome set of obligations on com-
mercial entities under the OST. 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Proposition #2: Ensuring compliance with OST obli-
gations by its commercial actors only requires minimal, light-
touch regulations. 
 
The OST only has seventeen articles—the last four of which 
deal with ratification, amendment, termination, and official lan-
guages of the treaty.126  An additional article deals with application 
of the treaty to “international intergovernmental organizations.”127  
Taking into account Article VI’s text and purposes, there are only 
eleven articles that could theoretically impose substantive obliga-
tions.  However, Article XI is a weak obligation “to the greatest ex-
tent practicable and feasible” for States to inform the UN Secretary 
General and the scientific community of their space activities.128  So 
in reality there are only ten articles that could impose substantive 
constraints on private space activities. 
Yet, many of the ten remaining articles’ substantive obligations 
do not in any way implicate private, commercial activities.  Indeed, 
                                                      
125 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th 
Cong. (2017) supra note 80 at § 3. 
126 OST, supra note 16, arts. XIV–XVII. 
127 See id. art. XIII (“The provisions of [the OST] shall apply to the activities of 
States Parties to the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space[,] . . . 
including cases where they are carried on within the framework of inter-
governmental organizations.”). 
128 See id. art. XI (“In order to promote international co-operation in the 
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, State Parties to the Treaty conducting 
activities in outer space . . . agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations . . . to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, 
locations and results of such activities.”). 
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some actually empower those activities.  Article I is empowering 
rather than limiting in most respects as it mandates “freedom of 
exploration and use” of outer space.129  The ordinary meaning of 
the word “use” would include exploitation.  If there is any ambigu-
ity in that, the negotiating history confirms it.  Most delegations at 
the time of drafting the OST agreed with the French delegate that 
“use” included exploitation, and the French delegate even men-
tioned uses of the moon, such as extraction of minerals.130  Article I 
does contain additional language that the exploration “shall be car-
ried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespec-
tive of their degree of economic or scientific development, and 
shall be the province of all mankind.”  However, the “benefit” and 
“province of mankind” language is universally interpreted to not 
require, for example, any resource or profit sharing; rather, it is re-
ferring to “benefit” in the more general sense that society benefits 
from the exploration.131 
Article IV’s prohibition on placement of WMDs in orbit or on 
celestial bodies does not implicate commercial space activities.132  
Article V has an obligation for astronauts to render all possible as-
sistance to one another in carrying out their activities, but it is often 
difficult for this assistance to occur in the space environment and, 
in any event, would only implicate human space flight activities.133  
The United States is party to the follow-on 1970 Return and Rescue 
Agreement laying out more detailed obligations, but, again, com-
mercial human space flight operators are highly unlikely to be 
burdened by any of these obligations. 
                                                      
129 See id. art. I (“The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of 
all countries . . . “). 
130 See Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space 
Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 419, 431 (1967) (describing the discussions around the 
drafting of the Outer Space Treaty). 
131 See Stephen Gorove, Implications of International Space Law for Private 
Enterprise, 7 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 319, 321 (1982) (interpreting the language 
of the treaty as not imposing specific obligations on private enterprises to share 
acquired benefits); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 83, at 62–63 See also Frans von der 
Dunk, International Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE L. 29, 57–59 (Frans von der 
Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015). 
132 See OST, supra note 16, art. IV . 
133 See id. art. V (“In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial 
bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the 
astronauts of other State Parties.”). 
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OST Article VII and the follow-on 1972 Liability Convention 
with more detailed rules only implicate a government’s pocket 
book by requiring the provision of compensation for the interna-
tional aspects of third-party liability.134  Private commercial actors 
face no burden via these obligations.  Rather, the United States  has 
a detailed regulatory regime applicable to both domestic and in-
ternational third-party liability situations, discussed briefly earlier 
in the Article, in which commercial launch operators are required 
to purchase third-party liability insurance up to the maximum 
probable loss (on average around $90 million in coverage with 
premiums at 0.1% of that amount) and the government has in place 
a long-term (ten-year) promise to indemnify the launch operators 
for the next $2.8 billion in liability.135  All others involved in the 
space launch (e.g., suppliers, contractors, customers, and SFPs) 
benefit as additional insureds on the policy purchased by the 
launch licensee and also benefit from the promise of government 
indemnification.136  The U.S. government currently does not re-
quire the purchase of on-orbit third-party liability insurance poli-
cies, although some other countries, like the United Kingdom, 
do.137  The United States could elect to enact such a requirement as 
part of an on-orbit regulatory scheme.  Importantly, however, Arti-
cle VII does not require these domestic requirements, so it is not 
imposing any constraints or costs on commercial private actors. 
Article VIII essentially creates what many believe is an indefi-
nite ownership rule concerning space assets which largely benefits 
commercial space actors by preventing theft of their assets and in-
stallations when in-orbit, on a celestial body, or even upon return 
                                                      
134 See Schaefer, supra note 45, at 263–65 (explaining that the Liability 
Convention does not cover single rocket or single aircraft accidents); see also 
Stephan Hobe, Legal Aspects of Space Tourism, 86 NEB. L. REV. 439, 450 (2007) 
(discussing the inability for passengers to claim compensation under the Liability 
Convention). 
135 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-
90, 129 Stat. 704, § 102(d) (“Launch Liability Extension.—Section 50915(f) is 
amended by striking ‘December 31, 2016’ and inserting ‘September 30, 2025’”); see 
also Schaefer, supra note 45, at 230–32 (explaining the U.S. third-party liability 
regime). 
136 See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-
90, 129 Stat. 704, § 103 (“Indemnification for Space Flight Participants”); Schaefer, 
supra note 45, at 263 (recommending SFPs be included in the indemnification 
regime); see also 51 U.S.C. § 50914 (2011)). 
137 See Schaefer, supra note 45, at 230 n.23 (explaining U.K. requirement for 
satellite operators to have third-party liability insurance). 
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to Earth.138  In terms of on-orbit activities, the indefinite ownership 
rule only potentially creates problems for entities wishing to en-
gage in active debris remediation of another nation’s debris in a 
non-consensual fashion.  Even here, potential constraints are re-
duced because smaller-sized space debris under ten centimeters, 
and even some larger debris, is of unknown origin, and thus would 
not require any form of consent to remediate.139  Further, Article 
VIII requires a registering state to maintain jurisdiction and control 
over its space objects, and a separate Registration Convention, to 
which the United States is a party, lays out obligations on registra-
tion.  Article VIII’s obligation to maintain jurisdiction may be an-
other reason for the United States to fill the regulatory gap with re-
spect to on-orbit activities, but it does not require any particular 
level of regulation.140 
What remains are Articles II, IX, X, and XII.  Article X and XII 
obligations are worded quite softly: 
 
Article X 
 
In order to promote international co-operation in the explo-
ration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this 
Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a ba-
sis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Trea-
ty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of 
space objects launched by those States. 
                                                      
138 See, e.g., Matthew Schaefer, Analogues Between Space Law and Law of the 
Sea/International Maritime Law: Can Space Law Usefully Borrow or Adapt Rules from 
these Other Areas of Public International Law? 55 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 316 (2012) 
(“[T]he ownership provision would appear to prevent any vacuum from 
occurring such that an entity wishing to conduct [active debris remediation] could 
still not seize the object.  The ownership of a space object in perpetuity, even once 
defunct or broken apart, under Art. VIII is thus the first major element of the 
space law regime creating a dilemma for those interested in pursuing” active 
debris remediation.”).  See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 83, at 67, 307 (stating that 
space objects cannot become abandoned property). 
139 See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note 136 (discussing the difficulties of 
implementing liability salvage). 
140 See von der Dunk, supra note 34, at 159 (“As the current substance of 
obligations under international space law is relatively limited in size and scope, in 
particular as regards the specifics of private activities and their rights and 
interests, the requirement resting upon states to actually and effectively exercise 
and implement jurisdiction could still result in a rather ‘light’ version thereof.”). 
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The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the condi-
tions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by 
agreement between the States concerned.141 
 
Article XII 
 
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on 
the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to repre-
sentatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of 
reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable ad-
vance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate 
consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be 
taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal 
operations in the facility to be visited.142 
Article X’s obligation is only an obligation to consider requests 
to observe the flight of space objects, not an obligation to approve 
such requests.  Additionally, any such opportunity to observe and 
any conditions imposed are to be determined by agreement be-
tween the States.  Similarly, Article XII’s obligation has a good de-
gree of flexibility.  While it says that stations, installations, and 
equipment on the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be open for 
visits, it is only on the basis of “reciprocity,” and it also makes clear 
that conditions can be imposed for safety and to avoid interference 
with operations.  Thus, for example, Planetary Resources’ future 
rovers or stations on asteroids, or Bigelow Aerospace’s future lunar 
habitats, would only need to be open on the basis of “reciprocity,” 
potentially limiting it to the very few other countries, if any, with 
similarly employed technology.  But even if reciprocity is not so 
narrowly interpreted,143 only a few countries with technological 
and financial abilities could even potentially invoke the right.  Ad-
ditionally, any such visit is subject to any safety and operational 
conditions or limits deemed necessary.144  Finally, it is quite possi-
ble that “the context and object and purpose of the provision may 
                                                      
141 OST, supra note 16, art. X (emphasis added). 
142 Id. art. XII (emphasis added). 
143 For the negotiating history of the article and the term “reciprocity,” see 
Dembling & Arons, supra note 130, at 448–50 (noting that the U.S. maintained an 
interpretation of reciprocity that was more open to visits than the Soviets did 
during the negotiations). 
144 For the negotiating history on these limits and conditions, see id. 
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very well indicate that it was intended to allow verification of arms 
control provisions of the OST, thus obviating the need for visits to 
U.S. commercial stations and equipment.”145  And even if it is ulti-
mately determined that a visit is required and clears all the requi-
site legal and practical hurdles, the U.S. government could go a 
step further and agree to reimburse U.S. commercial companies for 
the costs incurred as a result of any such visits. 
The last remaining articles, and those most frequently pointed 
to as potentially imposing significant limits on private activities, 
are Article II and Article IX.  Article II states the following: “Outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject 
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use 
or occupation, or by any other means.”146  This might at first glance 
be considered a limit on asteroid or lunar mining (either for in-situ 
resource utilization or return of materials to Earth), but the long-
standing U.S. interpretation, shared by a sizeable number of coun-
tries (roughly one-third) represented in the UN Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”) is that this provision 
does not prevent private property rights in extracted resources; ra-
ther, Article II only prevents claims of surface or sub-surface prop-
erty rights.147  Another third of countries believe there can be pri-
vate property rights in some instances and would, in any event, 
find it less objectionable if done with proper “authorization” and 
“continuing supervision” of the appropriate state party as required 
by Article VI.148  Indeed, Secretary of State Vance and then-Legal 
Adviser Owen put forth the U.S. interpretation in Congressional 
hearings in 1979 that private property rights were allowed with re-
spect to extracted resources.149  Congress recently passed legisla-
                                                      
145 Reopening the American Frontier: Exploring How the Outer Space Treaty Will 
Impact American Commerce and Settlement in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Space, Sci. & Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 115th Cong. 10 
(2017) (testimony of Matthew Schaefer, Co-Chair, American Branch of 
International Law Assoc. Space Law Committee). 
146 OST, supra note 16, Art. II. 
147 See Letter from Schaefer and Hertzfeld to Congressional Leaders (May 15, 
2015). 
148 Id. 
149 See Letter from Sec’y of State Vance to Sen. Church, Chairman of Senate 
Foreign Rel. Comm., (Nov. 28, 1979), in Agreement Governing the Activities of States 
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 
(Nov. 28, 1979), at 313 (stating that the Moon Treaty provides no moratorium on 
exploitation of space resources, that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty’s ban on 
appropriation only applies to resources in place, and that the Outer Space Treaty 
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tion signed into law by President Obama in November 2015 that 
essentially codifies this long-standing interpretation by providing 
the following: 
A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of 
an asteroid resource or a space resource . . . shall be entitled 
to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, includ-
ing to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid re-
source or space resource obtained in accordance with appli-
cable law, including the international obligations of the 
United States. 
It is the sense of Congress that by the enactment [of the 
above provision], the United States does not thereby assert 
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction 
over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.150 
Thus, Article II is no barrier to asteroid mining or the estab-
lishment of lunar facilities by U.S. entities.  Even though property 
rights in the surface or sub-surface of celestial bodies cannot be 
claimed under Article II, and OST Article I mandates “free access 
to all areas of celestial bodies,” Article IX of the OST does contain 
some minimal obligations to help prevent mining or other opera-
tions from being interfered with by second-comers.  Article IX re-
quires “due regard” to be shown to other nations’ space activities 
and also requires advance consultations if planning an activity that 
                                                      
and Moon Agreement would allow for ownership of extracted space resources); 
see also Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., & Space of the H. Comm. on Com., 
Sci. & Transp., 96th Cong. 2–19 (1980) (testimony of State Dept. Legal Advisor 
Owen) (“American companies will have a continuing legal right to exploit the 
Moon’s resources . . . .  [O]nce [resources] have been extracted from the Moon, 
ownership can be asserted . . .  [and] exploitation [can] go forward and . . . one can 
own what one can remove from the surface or subsurface of a celestial body . . . 
. [T]he negotiating history [of the Moon Agreement] makes it very clear that that 
was contemplated by the parties . . . . The United States took the position from the 
outset that such exploitation should be permitted, that such ownership after 
extraction should be permitted. And that . . . is an authoritative 
interpretation . . . . [W]e have insisted that even after [an international] regime is 
established [under the Moon Treaty], the right of unilateral exploitation will 
continue to be available to those States which choose not to participate in such a 
regime.”). 
150 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, PUB. L. NO. 114-90, 
129 STAT. 704, §§ 402(b), 403 (2015). 
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“would cause potentially harmful interference” with another na-
tion’s space activities. 
Article IX’s consultation requirement arises where a second-
comer miner or establisher of a lunar facility seeks to conduct a 
landing or engage in an activity too close to safely be accomplished 
next to the first-comer’s mine or facility.  Article IX provides that: 
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an 
activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would 
cause potentially harmful interference with activities of 
other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of 
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
it shall undertake appropriate international consultations 
before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. 
U.S. companies who are likely to be the first to engage in many 
new activities, and thus likely to be first-arrivers or first-movers, 
will certainly want the benefit of this obligation when it comes to 
foreign entities’ actions as second-movers. Thus, it is important for 
the U.S. government to follow through with its supervision obliga-
tions under Article VI for U.S. entities.  The U.S. government can-
not diplomatically push other countries to live up to their Article 
VI obligations or other OST obligations if it does not have a plausi-
ble case to be made that it is living up to its own obligations. 
Article IX also contains a two-way anti-contamination obliga-
tion. Specifically, it calls to “pursue studies of outer space, includ-
ing the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of 
them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse 
changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the intro-
duction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt 
appropriate measures for this purpose.”151  The first anti-
contamination obligation implicates on-orbit activities while the 
latter deals with adverse changes to the environment of Earth. The 
latter provision can already be addressed by the FAA under the 
payload review of a licensed reentry because the FAA can take ac-
count of public safety in that context.152  Those advocating a pure 
                                                      
151 OST, supra note 16, art. IX (emphasis added). 
152 See Laura Montgomery, supra note 111 (“The FAA’s payload review may 
arguably prevent contamination to Earth–if not from Earth–because the FAA may 
prevent a reentry if the reentry would jeopardize, among other things, public 
health and safety.”). 
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permissionless innovation-inspired interpretation of the OST, or in 
other words, those who ignore the import of Art. VI of the OST, are 
worried about the costs that might be associated with the applica-
tion of anti-contamination or planetary protection norms to new 
commercial space actors.153  They argue that planetary protection 
standards set by COSPAR, a body of scientists,154 could involve 
substantial compliance costs.155  However, COSPAR standards 
concerning the Moon are quite limited.  More importantly, 
COSPAR standards do not constitute “subsequent practice estab-
lishing the agreement of the parties” to the OST under Vienna 
Convention Law of Treaty interpretation rules156 and thus do not 
set a floor for planetary protection that must be followed by pri-
vate parties.  The State Department and other agencies rejected the 
notion that COSPAR would set a floor during the Moon Express 
payload review.157  The House Science Committee agreed, stating 
                                                      
153 Id. (“Although it is difficult to find information about the costs of 
planetary protection, one expedition cost somewhere between $80 to $100 million 
in 2003 dollars.  People are full of microorganisms.  I’m no biologist, but I think 
there are far more than 300,000 bacterial spores on the surface of the human body, 
never mind what’s inside us.  Are we planning to prohibit people on Mars?  
Probably not.  I hope not.”). 
154 See What We Do, COSPAR, https://www.icsu.org/what-we-do/research-
programmes/thematic-organizations/committee-on-space-research-cospar 
[https://perma.cc/YER5-YVXC] (explaining that COSPAR was established by 
ICSU in 1958 as an interdisciplinary scientific body concerned with the 
progress on an international scale of all kinds of scientific investigations 
carried out with space vehicles, rockets and balloons). 
155 See COSPAR’s Planetary Protection Policy, COSPAR (Oct. 20, 2002) amended 
Mar. 24, 2005, 
http://w.astro.berkeley.edu/~kalas/ethics/documents/environment/COSPAR
%20Planetary%20Protection%20Policy.pdf. [https://perma.cc/TU3B-NRPT] 
(detailing the planetary protection policy of COSPAR for the reference of 
spacefaring nations). 
156 VCLT, supra note 119, Art. 31(3)(b); see also U.N. General Assembly, 
International Law Commission Report, ¶9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.833 (June 3, 2014) 
(“1. An agreement under article 31, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), requires a common 
understanding regarding the interpretation of a treaty which the parties are aware 
of and accept. Though it shall be taken into account, such an agreement need not 
be legally binding. 2. The number of parties that must actively engage in 
subsequent practice in order to establish an agreement under article 31, paragraph 
3 (b), may vary. Silence on the part of one or more parties can constitute 
acceptance of the subsequent practice when the circumstances call for some 
reaction.”); see generally U.N. General Assembly, Second Report on Subsequent 
Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, ¶56 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/671 (Mar. 26, 2014). 
157 Discussions at 9th Annual University of Nebraska D.C. Space Law 
Conference (Oct. 2016). 
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in the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, that 
“[g]uidelines promulgated by [COSPAR] may not be considered 
international obligations of the United States.”158  The U.S. gov-
ernment has flexibility to establish commercial-era norms with a 
lower floor than those developed by COSPAR in a predominantly 
science-oriented era. 
In sum, the U.S. government, ensuring through authorization 
and continuing supervision compliance by U.S. commercial com-
panies with the few obligations that implicate commercial space 
plans, will not significantly constrain nor impose significant costs 
on U.S. commercial companies.  Thus, the authorization and su-
pervision regime established to comply with Article VI can be 
“light touch,” or one that is still within the range of the continuum 
that qualifies as in line with permissionless innovation thinking.  
Below is a sample checklist the FAA or other agency might use to 
ensure conformity with OST obligations by new on-orbit commer-
cial applicants: 
(1) Does the planned activity claim surface or sub-surface   
rights on a celestial body or prevent free access to all ar-
eas of a celestial body, while keeping in mind legitimate 
rights to be free from harmful interference?159 
(2) Does the planned activity cause potentially harmful in-
terference with foreign space activities?160 
(3) Does the planned activity risk harmful contamination of 
a celestial body with Earthly matter?161 
(4) Is the applicant respecting ownership rights of a foreign 
operator’s space object?162 
One might want to add as a fifth element, whether the appli-
cant is willing to discuss with the U.S. government allowing visits 
from foreign states based on reciprocity to its stations and equip-
ment with appropriate precautions to ensure safety and no inter-
ference with their operations.  But it is an open question whether 
                                                      
158 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th 
Cong. (2017) supra note 80 at § 3. 
159 OST, supra note 16, arts. I, II, IX. 
160 Id. at IX. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at XIII (likely only relevant for space debris remediation). 
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such a fifth element of the checklist, concerning visits to stations, is 
required in light of the context as well as object and purpose of 
OST Art. XII. That is why this fifth element is phrased simply as “if 
the applicant is willing to discuss a visit” should such a request 
arise.  As mentioned earlier, the U.S. government should reimburse 
a U.S. commercial actor for any costs associated with a visit, in the 
unlikely event that one occur, after clearing all legal interpretation 
and practical hurdles.  One might add a sixth element, that the ap-
plicant is willing to take possible steps to assist astronauts in dis-
tress should a need arise, although this is likely to be impossible in 
most circumstances. 
The above list is not onerous, particularly when one realizes 
that there is flexibility in how to define various terms, such as ‘po-
tentially harmful interference’ and ‘harmful contamination.’  As 
will be discussed later, the U.S. government can have the commer-
cial space industry involved in setting the standards that define 
those terms, provided such definitions do not stray from the ordi-
nary meaning of those terms.  To meet the continuing supervision 
obligation, the U.S. can require applicants to report material 
changes to operations or business plans and provide an annual re-
port to the agency on its activities. 
 
Proof of Propositions #3–5 
 
Having established the U.S. government is required by its in-
ternational obligations under the OST to ensure compliance with 
treaty provisions by U.S. commercial actors through authorization 
and continuing supervision and that any regulatory regime ensur-
ing such compliance can be true to permissionless innovation 
thinking by being light-touch in nature, we turn now to the follow-
ing proof of propositions #3-5: 
3) Congress made it clear in the legislative history to the   
1998 amendments to U.S. commercial space legislation 
that outside of FCC and NOAA licensing regimes for 
spectrum use and remote sensing, respectively, it was 
not granting authority to FAA or any other federal agen-
cy to regulate on-orbit activities; and 
4) There are limits to how far the FAA can stretch or utilize 
its existing payload review process to address on-orbit 
activities; and 
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5) Current FCC authority and NOAA authority does not al-
low the U.S. to ensure compliance by commercial actors 
with the minimal OST obligations. 
Proposition #3 is relatively straightforward.  The FAA is per-
haps hesitant to stretch the existing payload review process, 
i.e., leverage its authority, too far into a wholesale regulation of on-
orbit activities, given the legislative history and Congressional in-
tent surrounding the issue. House Committee Report 105-347, part 
of the legislative history of the 1998 amendments to the commercial 
space launch act that added “reentries” to FAA’s “launch” licens-
ing authority, states: 
The Committee wishes to make clear that the Secretary [of 
Transportation] has no authority to license or regulate ac-
tivities that take place between the end of the launch phase 
and the beginning of the reentry phase, such as maneuvers 
between two Earth orbits or other non-reentry operations in 
Earth orbit; or after the end of a launch phase in the case of 
missions where the payload is not a reentry vehicle.163 
Recently, the Executive Branch leveraged its payload review 
authority to satisfy its OST Art. VI obligations and approve a new 
on-orbit space activity.  In late July 2016, the FAA approved a pay-
load review request by Moon Express of its MX-1E space-
craft/lander that is “capable of transfer from Earth orbit to the 
Moon, making a soft landing on the lunar surface, and performing 
post-landing relocations through propulsive ‘hops.”‘  However, 
the Executive Branch was quick to caution that the approach may 
not work in all or even a majority of future instances.  Specifically, 
the FAA release states: 
For this particular mission and set of circumstances, the 
FAA concludes, in concurrence with the Department of 
State, that the enforcement of these representations [made 
by Moon Express] constitutes compliance with Article VI of 
the Outer Space Treaty.  This determination does not ex-
tend to future missions by Moon Express, Inc. or similar 
missions from other entities.  Any future requests for a pay-
load determination from Moon Express, Inc. or another en-
tity will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  The FAA 
                                                      
163 H.R. REP. NO. 105-347 (1997). 
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made a favorable payload determination for this particular 
mission, however, not all non-traditional space missions 
may lend themselves to favorable payload determinations 
under the payload review authority . . . .  Future missions 
may require additional authority to be provided to the FAA 
to ensure conformity with the Outer Space Treaty. . . . In the 
absence of legislative relief, the FAA will continue to work 
with the commercial space industry to provide support for 
non-traditional missions on a case-by-case basis when the 
law permits.164 
Apparently, the limited nature of Moon Express activities made 
it possible to use the existing payload review process, but more so-
phisticated activities might cause more difficulties in using the ex-
isting payload review process.  Moon Express volunteered to com-
ply with COSPAR’s planetary protection guidelines and as 
discussed above, those applicable to the Moon Express are quite 
limited, involving only a reporting requirement.  There is also 
some question as to whether the FAA has authority to impose con-
ditions or rather only give a thumbs up or thumbs down in a cur-
rent payload review.165  The Obama Administration’s Mission Au-
thorization framework, Rep. Bridenstine’s Enhanced Payload 
Review determination, and the House Science Committee’s Ameri-
can Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act all explicitly allow for a 
‘yes,’ with conditions rather than simply approval or denial. 
A year earlier, in 2015, the U.S. Executive Branch responded fa-
vorably to a Bigelow Aerospace payload review request to protect 
Bigelow’s (future) orbital and lunar facilities from interfering oper-
ations.  The FAA responded positively, indicating it would lever-
                                                      
164 FAA, FAA Fact Sheet—Moon Express Payload Review Determination, 
FAA (Aug. 3, 2016), 
https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=20595 
[https://perma.cc/3WG4-NYTH] (noting that the FAA accepted the application 
and proceeded with review for a Payload Review and Determination on the MX-
1E spacecraft on April 21, 2016). 
165 See, e.g., Jeff Foust, Proposed Legislation Would Close Commercial Space 
Regulatory Gap, SPACENEWS (Sept. 15, 2016), http://spacenews.com/proposed-
legislation-would-close-commercial-space-regulatory-gap/ 
[https://perma.cc/YN4B-DHZK] (“A longer, more sophisticated mission, [State 
Dept. Lawyer Brian] Israel suggested, might be harder to approve currently 
without the ability to set conditions on a payload review. ‘Our lack of ability to 
say ‘yes, but’ to prescribe conditions necessary for compliance with the treaty 
would put U.S. in a bind,’ he said.”). 
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age authority in response to Bigelow Aerospace’s payload review 
request concerning the creation of zones of non-interference for its 
space habitats.  The FAA, in consultation with the State Depart-
ment, Department of Defense, NASA, NOAA, and other agencies, 
declared that it will use its current launch licensing authority as 
best as it can to protect space facilities, hardware, and personnel by 
ensuring zones of non-interference with commercial operations.  
However, the zones of non-interference will only apply vis-à-vis 
others being licensed by FAA, mostly U.S. corporations.  While 
these decisions are a sign that FAA recognizes the importance of 
protecting and stimulating private sector investments in new space 
activities,166 the limits the FAA placed on leveraging existing pay-
load review authority are a strong indication that such leveraging 
will not fill the gap entirely. 
Finally, some argue that there is no “gap” that needs to be 
filled because the FCC licenses spectrum for use by a spacecraft 
undertaking on-orbit activities and many of the spacecrafts going 
to space are capable of sensing Earth and therefore need a NOAA 
license too.  Thus, according to this argument, the U.S. is authoriz-
ing and supervising its commercial actors’ on-orbit or in-space ac-
tivities already.  The problem here is that the FCC and NOAA lack 
authority to take into account compliance with all OST obligations 
in issuing licenses.  For example, can NOAA and the FCC take into 
account planetary protection issues flowing from OST Art. IX’s 
harmful contamination (planetary protection) obligation when li-
censing a spacecraft under their respective laws and regulations? 
With respect to NOAA, the answer is no it may not.  51 U.S.C. 
§ 60121(a)(2) provides the following: 
LIMITATION WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEM USED FOR 
OTHER PURPOSES.— 
In the case of a private space system that is used for remote 
sensing and other purposes, the authority of the Secretary 
under this subchapter shall be limited only to the remote 
sensing operations of such space system. 
                                                      
166 See Matthew Schaefer, Assessing the U.S. House of Representatives’ SPACE 
Act of 2015 (H.R. 2262) and the related U.S. Senate Bill (S. 1297), Part IV – Providing 
for or Allocating On-Orbit (or In-Space) Jurisdiction, LAW OF SCHAEFER (Aug. 19, 
2015), www.lawofschaefer.com/ [https://perma.cc/4U2S-MUNV] (arguing that 
the legislative history of amendments to the Commercial Space Launch Act 
indicates that Congress did not intend to allocate licensing authority to the FAA 
for in-space or on-orbit activities). 
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The FCC also lacks authority to ensure compliance with all 
OST obligations.  The FCC has taken into account foreign policy in-
terests as part of its broader public interest analysis when assessing 
whether a U.S. satellite can utilize a foreign ground station or a 
foreign-registered satellite can provide service in the United 
States.167 However, absent unusual facts, the FCC has not taken in-
to account foreign policy interests in deciding on U.S. satellite spec-
trum applications; it would be breaking from tradition and practice 
to do so.168  Moreover, the FCC jurisdiction is based on radio com-
munications,169 thus any foreign policy considerations they can 
take into account should likely be limited to foreign policy implica-
tions connected with the use of the radio spectrum, not, for exam-
ple, the violation of unrelated OST obligations, such as harmful 
contamination (planetary protection) obligations. 
 
4.2.  National Security Risk and Regulatory Uncertainty Risk  
 
Every-day, non-illicit space activities have national security 
implications.  For example, debris created by pure accident can risk 
making orbits unusable,170 and accidental interference with satel-
lites or space operations may raise concerns given the difficulty in 
                                                      
167 See, e.g., FCC, Disco II Application (“In the DISCO II Order, the Commission 
set forth the public interest analysis applicable in evaluating applications to use 
non-U.S. licensed space stations to provide satellite service in the United States.  
In conducting this analysis, we consider the effect on competition in the United 
States, spectrum availability, eligibility requirements and operating (e.g., 
technical) requirements.  In addition, we consider issues of national security, law 
enforcement, foreign policy and trade policy, when those issues are brought to 
our attention by the Executive Branch with regard to a particular application.  
After consideration of these issues, we find that the public interest would be 
served by a grant of USAsia Telecom[‘]s application.”). 
168 See FCC, PETITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE 
ORGANIZATION UNDER SECTION 316 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT, AS AMENDED, DA 
07-4715, Nov. 23, 2007. 
169 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–52 (2012) (establishing the FCC to regulate 
communications by wire and radio). 
170 See Tomasz Nowakowski, Space Debris Expert Warns about Dangers of Or-
bital Junk, PHYS.ORG, Jan. 12, 2015, https://phys.org/news/2015-01-space-debris-
expert-dangers-orbital.html [https://perma.cc/U4KA-8G9Y] (stressing 
importance of international cooperation over the problem of floating space junk 
and the multiple dangerous effects space junk may have on orbiting operational 
spacecraft). 
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establishing intent and attribution in space.171  Getting to space in-
volves technology similar to an intercontinental ballistic missile.  
The U.S. military operates its own satellites but also increasingly 
leases transponders on commercial satellites.172  These satellites are 
used for “nuclear command and control apparatus, military and 
intelligence surveillance, and national security communications 
and coordination.”173  No nation is more militarily reliant on space 
assets than the United States.174  Interference with those assets is, 
and will remain, a national security concern.175  It is implausible for 
the U.S. government to give carte blanche approval to activities in 
outer space without at least minimal national security review.  In-
deed, the Executive Branch would face strong temptations to lev-
                                                      
171 See Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, 
and Implementation, Remarks to the George C. Marshall Institute Roundtable at 
the National Press Club (as prepared) ,March 4, 2008, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rm/101711.htm [https://perma.cc/N6EM-3SK5 ] 
(“Clearly, the fact that a space object has been destroyed, or has sustained damage 
or injury, or that its parameters have been altered is detectable with high 
confidence by the satellite owner and, in some instances, by the National 
Technical Means (NTM) of other states. The attribution of such an action to 
another state may be possible with high confidence in the case of a direct intercept 
or of a collision with an object known to belong to that other state. However, 
identification (as an attack) may not be possible if the other state denies that its 
action was deliberate. Further, identification (as an attack) and/or attribution (to a 
state) may not be possible in other instances—e.g., if there were no observable 
intercept or collision, as in the case of a remote, covert telemetric attack on the 
software of the object’s operating system or if the damage were caused by ‘space 
debris.’ Attribution also could be a challenge with certain types of launches, e.g., 
from locations at sea.”). 
172 See Timothy M. Bonds & Isaac R. Porche III, Satellites for Rent, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-
report/2013/11/07/limiting-the-pentagons-reliance-on-commercial-satellites. 
[https://perma.cc/H5CX-ASWK] (describing different models of satellites 
utilized by the U.S. government, and proposing other leasing strategies that could 
increase and diversify supply). 
173 See JOSHUA HAMPSON, THE FUTURE OF SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION, NISKANEN 
CENTER (Jan.  25, 2017), https://niskanencenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S5LB-899E]. 
174 See Omar Lamrani, What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War, 
THE NAT’L INT. (May 18, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-
the-us-military-fears-most-massive-space-war-16248 [https://perma.cc/5NYT-
CA36 ] (“For the United States, being the leader in military space technologies 
provides immense advantages. At the same time, its outsized reliance on those 
technologies entails risks. The current unequal dependence on space, the United 
States fears, could give adversaries incentive to attack its infrastructure in orbit.”). 
175 Id. 
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erage its existing payload review authority to prevent any on-orbit 
activities that threaten national security.176  Industry acknowledges 
this dynamic.  Businesses focused on new activities do not want a 
dysfunctional process that delays deployment of new technologies 
or decisions based on outdated benefit-cost analysis, even with re-
gards to national security interests.  They do, however, understand 
that a pure permissionless innovation model is simply impractica-
ble in the outer space domain.  Indeed, at its October 2016 meeting, 
COMSTAC made the following finding and recommendation: 
The COMSTAC finds that the current lack of an explicit, de-
fined process for commercial space activities that are not 
currently explicitly supervised by a U.S. Government 
Agency has resulted in a lack of stability, predictability, 
transparency, and efficiency, which has and will continue 
to hinder the development of domestic commercial space 
operations. 
RECOMMENDATION: 
COMSTAC recommends that, in meetings and discussions 
with policymakers, regardless of the ultimate approach 
taken to meet the nation’s international treaty obligations, 
the U.S. Government should take expeditious action to en-
able a safe, predictable, and conducive environment for the 
growth of commercial space operations and activities . . . .177 
Fortunately, U.S. national security interests connected with 
many of the expected new activities—such as on-orbit and lunar 
habitats and research labs, and asteroid and space resource min-
                                                      
176 See, e.g. Regulating Space: Innovation, Liberty, and International Obligations 
hearing before the Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Science, 115th 
Cong. (March 8, 2017) (statement of Doug Loverro, Former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy) 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/SY/SY16/20170308/105659/HHRG-115-SY16-
Wstate-LoverroD-20170308.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE2Y-B48B] (presenting an 
example of collaboration between private sector and Executive Branch to 
eliminate a program’s national security risks). 
177 COMSTAC proposed OFR’s, (Oct. 26, 2016) (on file with author); 
(adoption confirmed by and available at Marcia Smith, Bridenstine: This is Our 
Sputnik Moment & The Moon Will Ensure U.S. Preeminence in Space, 
SPACEPOLICYONLINE.COM ( November 3, 2016 12:43 am ET), 
http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/bridenstine-this-is-our-sputnik-
moment-the-moon-will-ensure-u-s-preeminence-in-space 
[https://perma.cc/GX47-HR57]). 
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ing—align with its commercial interests.  U.S. national security is 
generally enhanced if U.S. commercial companies are leaders in 
these industries rather than second-movers.  On-orbit satellite ser-
vicing or active debris remediation technologies—because the 
technology can be adapted for satellite weaponry—is a closer call.  
But even here if the technology is to come to market, it is far better 
for U.S. national security if it is the U.S. industry to lead the devel-
opment of the technology rather than foreign countries.  If Con-
gress does not enact a transparent and stable process, then the Ex-
ecutive Branch will always face temptations to leverage existing 
authorities and commercial space businesses will be left wondering 
if activities will be blocked or limited by the government at the last 
minute or after significant investment in time and money.  Thus, in 
addition to limiting the international obligation risk, a “light 
touch” authorization and supervision process can diminish both 
national security risk for the government as well as regulatory un-
certainty risk for the commercial space industry. 
 
5.  EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS TO CURE 
THE ON-ORBIT REGULATORY GAP 
 
The benefits of Congress filling the on-orbit regulatory gap are 
numerous.  First, it will ensure that the United States can meet its 
international obligations under Article VI of the OST.  Meeting our 
international obligations will lessen opposition and diplomatic 
complaints among some countries to controversial activities such 
as asteroid mining.  Correspondingly, it will prevent actions by 
foreign governments against foreign partners cooperating with, or 
foreign customers purchasing from, U.S. commercial space busi-
nesses engaged in on-orbit activities.  Second, it will also ensure 
that U.S. national security concerns will be addressed in a more 
certain and predictable manner.  Third, it can provide regulatory 
certainty to space industry investors.  However, doing so does not 
require Congress to abandon pursuit of permissionless innovation 
thinking.  Congress, in filling the gap, should also seek to maxim-
ize permissionless innovation thinking within the on-orbit regula-
tory framework it creates, as well as help advance a permissionless 
innovation esprit de corps in the inter-agency process considering 
applications. 
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Three proposals to cure the gap have been advanced in the past 
two years: (i) the Obama Administration’s Mission Authorization 
proposal of April 4, 2016 (delineated in a report required by Sec-
tion 108 of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Act of 2015), (ii) 
Representative Bridenstine’s American Space Renaissance Act bill’s 
proposal for an enhanced payload review process for after deploy-
ment activities of payloads, and (iii) the 2017 House Science Com-
mittee’s American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill calling 
for a certification process.  The three proposals are examined below 
along with options for improving the permissionless innovation 
quotient in each, or alternatively, in the case of the third proposal, 
ensuring its proposed certification process sufficiently addresses 
international obligation and national security risk factors that can 
undermine the benefits of permissionless innovation. 
 
5.1.  The Executive Branch’s Proposed Mission Authorization 
Framework of April 4, 2016 
 
In November 2015, President Obama signed into law the U.S. 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015. The law in 
Section 108 contains a reporting requirement for the Executive 
Branch (Director of OSTP) to address the on-orbit authority issue, 
namely to undertake the following: 
(1) assess current, and proposed near-term, commercial 
non-governmental activities conducted in space; 
(2) identify appropriate authorization and supervision au-
thorities for the activities described in paragraph (1); 
(3) recommend an authorization and supervision approach 
that would prioritize safety, utilize existing authorities, 
minimize burdens to the industry, promote the U.S. 
commercial space sector, and meet the United States ob-
ligations under international treaties . . . .178 
Section 108 adopted the Senate bill’s language over that of the 
House bill.  The House bill would have only required an examina-
tion of on-orbit authority in the context of space resource and as-
                                                      
178 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90. 
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teroid resource extraction activities.179  As noted above, asteroid 
mining is only one of many future on-orbit activities.  The Senate 
bill focused, as did the final law, on current and “near-term” new 
activities180 without defining what “near-term” means (i.e., three 
years?  Five years?  Ten years?  Or more?). 
Most space companies and investors want certainty as to the 
on-orbit licensing processes sooner rather than later.  However, a 
few may wish for a delay to prevent any risk of adoption of an in-
appropriate or overly complex framework, created without benefit 
of first seeing the activities that come to market.  Skeptics of imme-
diate legislative fixes indicate that there is always a possibility of 
continuing to modestly stretch current authorities for some activi-
ties that creep up earlier than expected.  Government agencies, par-
ticularly the U.S. State Department, wish to have a framework in 
place sooner rather than later in order to minimize any diplomatic 
complaints, particularly over activities such as asteroid mining.  
The U.S. framework could possibly serve as a model for other na-
tions while also ensuring compliance with U.S. international obli-
gations. There are hints of this tension in Section 108’s requiring a 
report by the Executive Branch and seemingly wanting to push the 
process along sooner but with the focus placed on current and 
“near-term” activities, suggesting some sympathy to treading more 
slowly as activities occur. 
The report required by Section 108 of the U.S. Commercial 
Space Launch Competitiveness Act was released by White 
House/OSTP on April 4, 2016.181  The report does not draw a 
bright line for what constitutes “near-term” activities, but does 
mention activities that might occur within one year as well as ac-
tivities that might “not begin for a decade or more.”182  The three 
categories of activities addressed in the report are: (i) private mis-
sions beyond Earth Orbit (e.g., commercial missions to the Moon or 
Mars and commercial lunar habitat), (ii) new on-orbit activities 
(e.g., on-orbit satellite servicing, including repair and refueling, 
and commercial orbital habitats), and (iii) space resource utiliza-
tion (e.g., extracting/mining resources from asteroids or the 
Moon).183  The report states that the U.S. government has imple-
                                                      
179 H.R. Res. 2262, § 402 114th Cong. (2015). 
180 S. Res. 1297, § 7 114th Cong. (2015). 
181 Holdren, supra note 19. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
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mented its OST Article VI obligations to  “authorize” and “contin-
ually supervise” through licensing conditions with separate 
frameworks for launch/reentry, remote sensing, and communica-
tions adding that these existing frameworks do not “provide clear 
avenues through which the U.S. government can fulfill its Art. VI 
obligations in relation to the newly contemplated commercial 
space activities.”184 
The report highlighted the desire, by many companies, for a 
“clear and predictable oversight process that ensures access to 
space and imposes minimal burdens on the industry.”185 Accord-
ingly, the report made a suggestion for such an oversight process, 
called the “Mission Authorization” proposal. 
Modeled on the payload review process of the FAA, the April 
4, 2016 OSTP report recommends a new “Mission Authorization” 
framework and states a belief that legislation creating such a 
framework “would encourage investment in [new space] activi-
ties . . . .”186  The Mission Authorization proposal is similar to the 
FAA’s payload review process in that the FAA would coordinate 
an inter-agency process on a case-by-case basis.  The proposal does 
not authorize any agency to adopt substantive, generally applica-
ble regulations.187  The Mission Authorization proposal defines 
“mission” to involve “the operation of a space object, with or with-
out human occupants, in outer space, including the Moon and oth-
er celestial bodies,”188 but explicitly excludes those activities requir-
ing an FCC or NOAA license. 
One further benefit of establishing the Mission Authorization 
proposal, according to the report, is that the current payload re-
view process only applies to payloads launched from the United 
States, whereas the Mission Authorization proposal would apply 
to U.S. nationals regardless of launch location.  As such, it would 
eliminate any potential disincentive for U.S. nationals to launch 
from foreign countries.189  Another benefit is that it would open the 
door to “yes, but . . . ” answers in response to requests for authori-
zation as, according to some government officials, the current pay-
                                                      
184 Id. at 3. 
185 Id. at 4. 
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187 Id. 
188 Id. app. at 6-7. 
189 Id. at 4–5. 
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load review process does not allow for any conditions.190  Under 
the proposal, conditions can be placed on mission authorizations if 
“deem[ed] necessary for compliance with United States interna-
tional obligations, preservation of the foreign policy interests and 
national security of the United States, and protection of United 
States government uses of outer space.”191 
 
5.2.  Rep. Bridenstine’s American Space Renaissance Act Bill’s (H.R. 
4945) Enhanced Payload Review 
 
In April 2016, Representative Bridenstine from Oklahoma re-
leased H.R. 4945, or the “American Space Renaissance Act,” with-
out formally introducing it.192  The bill states the sense of Congress 
that existing law is sufficient authority for the U.S. to meet its in-
ternational obligations under the OST.193  However, it proceeds to 
call on the DOT (specifically, a newly created Assistant Secretary 
for Commercial Space Transportation) to issue regulations “as are 
necessary to provide for enhanced review and determination pro-
cess for payloads and associated activities after deployment,” pursu-
ant to a launch license.194  The bill also calls for enhanced coordina-
tion and participation of DOT with other agencies, specifically 
including the Department of State, Department of Defense, De-
partment of Commerce, NASA, and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence.195 
Section 309 of the Bridenstine bill appears to be responsive to at 
least some of Chairman Babin’s concerns regarding the Mission 
Authorization proposal, specifically Chairman Babin’s concern that 
the on-orbit approval process will face the same pitfalls as the 
                                                      
190 See, e.g., Jeff Foust, Proposed Legislation Would Close Commercial Space 
Regulatory Gap, SPACENEWS (Sept. 15, 2016), http://spacenews.com/proposed-
legislation-would-close-commercial-space-regulatory-gap/ 
[https://perma.cc/9VXY-QNP7]).(“A longer, more sophisticated mission, [State 
Dept. lawyer Brian] Israel suggested, might be harder to approve currently 
without the ability to set considerations on a payload review.  ‘Our lack of ability 
to say ‘yes, but. . .’ to prescribe conditions necessary for compliance with the 
treaty would put the U.S. in a bind,’ he said.”). 
191 Holdren Letter, supra note 19, app. at 6-7. 
192 H.R. Res. 4945, 114th Cong. (2016). 
193 Id. § 309(a)(1). 
194 Id. § 309(a)(2). 
195 Id. § 309(a)(2)(B). 
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NOAA process for remote sensing, including lengthy delays.  
Thus, under Rep. Bridenstine’s bill, determinations are required 
within sixty days of submission, by the payload owner or operator, 
of information sufficient to make an enhanced review and deter-
mination. If sixty days pass without a determination, approval is 
deemed to have occurred.196  Conditions may be imposed to ensure 
consistency with U.S. treaty obligations, protection of U.S. national 
security, prevention of harmful interference with already approved 
activities, and protection of historic artifacts.197  If DOT denies a li-
cense due to a payload and its associated activities, it must provide 
the owner or operator with a clearly articulate rationale so that 
they can attempt to remedy any defect.198 
 
5.3.  House Science Committee’s American Space Commerce Free 
Enterprise Act Bill (H.R. 2809) of June 2017 
 
The House Science Committee approved and reported out of 
committee H.R. 2809 on June 8, 2017.199  The bill seeks to establish a 
certification regime for new on-orbit space activities.  The Secretary 
of Commerce, rather than the FAA, is empowered by the bill to is-
sue certificates to applicants that meet the requirements outlined in 
the bill.200  In essence, applicants have to describe the proposed op-
erations of their space object (where and when it will operate) and 
attest that they are not carrying any WMD or testing weapons on 
celestial bodies (that is, not violating OST Art. IV).201  The Secretary 
of Commerce “shall as he determines necessary” consult with oth-
er agencies on the application.202 Thus, an interagency discussion is 
                                                      
196 Id. § 309(a)(2)(C)(i). 
197 Id. § 309(a)(2)(C)(ii). 
198 Id. § 309(a)(2)(C)(iii). 
199 See American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act Bill, H.R. 2809, 115th 
Cong. (2017) supra note 80 (amending Title 51 of the United States Code to 
provide for the authorization and supervision of nongovernmental space 
activities). 
200 See id at § 3 (focusing on authorization and supervision of issuing 
certificates to operate space objects). 
201 Id. 
202 COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE & TECHNOLOGY, AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2809 
OFFERED BY MR. SMITH OF TEXAS, 
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not absolutely required, although even weaker language utilizing 
the word “may” was in the bill originally and strengthened to 
“shall” after an amendment at the bill’s mark-up by the commit-
tee.203  If the Secretary of Commerce exceeds the time deadline for 
decision, the certification is considered approved without condi-
tion.204  The Secretary of Commerce can condition or deny an ap-
plication for a certification if the Secretary cannot verify infor-
mation in the application or if the Secretary determines with clear 
and convincing evidence that the activity would violate an interna-
tional obligation of the United States under the OST.205  However, 
as noted earlier, in making that determination, the Secretary is 
supposed to interpret the OST in a minimally burdensome way, 
but without any acknowledgement of Vienna Convention treaty 
interpretation rules, nor the State Department’s traditional role in 
administering treaty interpretation of the OST.206  Indeed, under 
the statute, only the Secretary of Commerce is allowed to make 
findings regarding OST obligations in the case of U.S. commercial 
actors’ new space activities.207  There is no specific mention of any 
other criteria the Secretary can take into account in conditioning or 
denying a certification—no specific national security criteria ex-
ists.208  There is a provision in the statute addressing a situation in 
which a certification holder’s space operations pose a threat to the 
physical safety of an American government asset.209  However, in 
such a situation, the Secretary is only entitled to hold a consulta-
tion between the affected parties and report the results to Con-
gress, but the Secretary is not empowered to impose conditions on 
operations as a result of the consultation.210 
 
                                                      
/SMITTX_012_xml.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLE5-W8GG] (adopted at Committee 
Mark-Up by voice vote). 
203 Id. 
204 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th 
Cong. (2017) supra note 80 at §3. 
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6.  WHEN CONGRESS ACTS TO CURE THE ON-ORBIT REGULATORY 
GAP, HOW CAN IT MAXIMIZE PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION 
THINKING AND PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION ESPRIT DE CORPS 
WITHIN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS, WHILE ENSURING 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION RISK AND NATIONAL SECURITY RISK 
ARE SUFFICIENTLY MINIMIZED? 
 
Worries exist that the interagency process created by a Mission 
Authorization Framework or an Enhanced Payload Review Process 
will lead to lengthy delays in approval or authorization or lead to 
overly burdensome regulation.  This does not appear to be the in-
tent of those proposing or supporting cures to the on-orbit regula-
tory gap, and so the question arises what provisions can be injected 
as “friendly amendments” to limit an overly-restrictive or burden-
some process on the commercial space industry.  Additionally, the 
question arises as to what suggestions for change to these ap-
proaches should be avoided.  However, the Certification Process 
laid out by the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill 
raises the opposite concern: whether its desire for permissionless 
innovation thinking goes too far, thereby creating international ob-
ligation risk as well as national security risk issues that undermine 
the ultimate benefits of permissionless innovation. 
 
6.1.  Features That Should be Adopted in any Proposal to Cure the 
Regulatory Gap for New On-Orbit Space Activities 
 
6.1.1.  Creating a Default Presumption in Favor of Approval. 
 
Key to permissionless innovation thinking is the establishment 
of a policy default of approval of the development and deployment 
of new technologies.  In an attempt to ensure that decisions are 
reached in a timely fashion and create a default rule in favor of ap-
proval, Rep. Bridenstine’s bill attempts to use a “deemed author-
ized” provision. That is, if no decision on an on-orbit activity ap-
plication is given within set number of days, then the applicant’s 
activities are “deemed authorized.”211  The American Space Com-
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merce Free Enterprise Act bill also contains a similar provision.212  
The problem with a “deemed authorized” provision, while it is 
consistent with the default of approval in permissionless innova-
tion thinking, is that it may simply lead to a “no” answer if no de-
cision has been reached within the time window provided.  That 
answer will be given to avoid having the activity be deemed au-
thorized.  In other words, a “deemed authorized” provision can 
backfire and essentially lead to a default of no permission.  Instead, 
any law granting Executive Branch authority should simply de-
clare a presumption in favor of approval. 
Indeed, Congress could even go further and create a “foreseea-
ble harm” requirement.  The requirement would mandate the 
agency to find “foreseeable harm” to one of the listed inter-
ests/factors the agency is to consider in authorization decisions.  
Such a requirement can act to avoid precautionary principle think-
ing seeping into the process.  Congress recently employed a fore-
seeable harm requirement in the context of improvements to FOIA 
to buttress presumptions in favor of release of information, so it is 
a tool with which Congress is familiar.213  The American Space 
Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill employs a “clear and convinc-
ing” evidence standard for international obligation violations that 
can also assist a presumption in favor of allowing activities.214  
However, use of this evidentiary standard raises the risk of a litiga-
tion-centric approach, and there is no absolute certainty that it is 
the standard that would be employed internationally for viola-
tions.215  Moreover, the evidentiary standard does not work as well 
for a national security criterion, but of course, such a criterion is 
absent in the bill, as we will see below. 
 
                                                      
212 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, supra note 80, at 
§3. 
213 See FOIA IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2015, S. REP. 114-4, (2015) (reviewing the 
FOIA Improvement Act’s of 2015 background, purpose, history, and regulatory 
impact evaluation, and recommending passage of the bill). 
214 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th 
Cong. (2017) supra note 80, at §3. 
215 For example, the International Court of Justice has not made clear what 
standard of proof they would employ for a state responsibility issue, although 
there is some support for the clear and convincing evidence standard.  See, e.g., 
Marco Roscini, Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Related to State Responsi-
bility for Cyber Operations, 50 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 234, 248-51 (2015) (examining possible 
methods and standards of proof in the context of international cyber operations). 
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6.1.2.  Limiting Factors that Can be Considered by the Executive 
Branch but Not So Much as to Create International Obligation 
Risk, National Security Risk or Interference with Operations 
Risk. 
 
The Mission Authorization Framework proposed by the 
Obama administration bans the issuance of substantive regula-
tions.  Instead, there is an ex ante interagency process established 
that will consider four factors: (i) compliance with international ob-
ligations, (ii) U.S. national security interests, (iii) U.S. foreign policy 
interests, and (iv) protection of U.S. government uses of outer 
space. 
Rep. Bridenstine’s bill contains a similar set of factors to con-
sider but with some differences.  Bridenstine’s four factors include, 
like the Obama Administration’s Mission Authorization frame-
work, compliance with international obligations and U.S. national 
security interests.  However, Bridenstine’s four factors do not in-
clude foreign policy interests, nor protection of U.S. government 
uses of outer space.  Dropping these two probably helps favor 
permissionless innovation thinking.  Dropping foreign policy in-
terests as a factor limits discretion to disapprove new space activi-
ties.  Foreign policy interests are a broader potential limit than 
compliance with international obligations and national security in-
terests, both of which might be considered to encompass a subset 
of all foreign policy interests.  Eliminating protection of U.S. gov-
ernment uses of outer space as a criterion is consistent with Con-
gressional calls to utilize commercial services to the maximum ex-
tent,216 and in any event, the national security factor already 
adequately protects national security assets and activities. 
Rep. Bridenstine’s approach has the following additional fac-
tors included: the activity must “not result in harmful interference 
with approved and operating payloads and associated activities,” 
and must “not harm historic artifacts.”217  The first additional fac-
tor is necessary to protect U.S. commercial first movers from inter-
ference from U.S. commercial second-movers.  Compliance with 
international obligations only deals with interference between U.S. 
companies and foreign entities.  The second additional factor is 
fairly narrow—likely referring to Tranquility Base, the location on 
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the Moon where Neil Armstong’s footprints still reside, as do other 
similar artifacts, and would only implicate activities on the Moon 
in any event.218  Rep. Bridenstine’s list of factors, being a bit nar-
rower, appears to be more friendly to permissionless innovation 
than those in the Mission Authorization Framework. 
The American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill basi-
cally limits its criteria to international obligations, with numerous 
limitations on how those international obligations can be interpret-
ed and a high standard (clear and convincing) for proving their vi-
olation.219  It almost appears that, except for those OST Art. IV ob-
ligations related to WMD and weapons testing, the bill is making it 
difficult to consider other minimally burdensome OST obligations 
laid out in the checklist earlier in this article. Yet, arguably some-
what inconsistently, the marked-up bill calls on the President to 
protect U.S. entities from harmful interference, protect ownership 
interests of U.S. entities’ space objects, and ensure that U.S. entities 
operations are given due regard.220  In other words, it calls on the 
President to protect OST Art. VIII and IX rights of U.S. entities 
without requiring the President to ensure that threats to these 
rights are proven by clear and convincing evidence.  The bill, as 
worded, thus creates a risk that foreign countries may view the 
U.S. as not respecting their OST rights to the same degree the U.S. 
is expecting its OST rights to be respected, and consequently raises 
the prospect of foreign retaliation. 
The bill also does not contain any general national security cri-
teria, and only allows for a consultation and report to Congress on 
such consultation, should the commercial activity threaten the 
physical safety of a U.S. government space asset.  The bill thus 
might have narrowed the criteria for approval too much.  It creates 
a risk of the U.S. government potentially stepping in to block an ac-
                                                      
218 See, e.g., Michael Milstein, NASA Looks to Protect Historic Sites on the Moon, 
SMITHSONIAN (June 2008), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-
nature/nasa-looks-to-protect-historic-sites-on-the-moon-47186092 
[https://perma.cc/3E4A-XZR6] (discussing NASA’s guidelines to protect historic 
lunar landmarks and high importance of international norms governing lunar 
archaeology); see also Alice Gorman, Look, But Don’t Touch: U.S. Law and the Protec-
tion of Lunar Heritage, SPACE.COM (Dec. 6, 2013, http://www.space.com/23860-
look-but-dont-touch-us-law-and-the-protection-of-lunar-heritage.html 
[https://perma.cc/79M9-EQMC] (stressing urgency of adequate Moon heritage 
protection). 
219 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th 
Cong. (2017) supra note 80, at §§ 3, 5. 
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tivity and overstretching authorities in case of a rare but significant 
national security issue being raised.  The risks of foreign retaliation 
or last-minute blockages by the federal government potentially 
undermine the purported benefits of a (too) pure permissionless 
innovation regime. 
Furthermore, the bill does not include interference with the ac-
tivities of an already approved U.S. commercial space object as a 
criterion.  There is some concern that some entities might attempt 
to use non-interference rights to “space squat” and block potential 
competitors from certain areas or regions.  Indeed, the bill declares 
that the Secretary of Commerce “may not deny an application for a 
certification. . .in order to protect an existing certification holder 
from competition.”221 This is good policy in isolation, but any solu-
tion to the regulatory gap must also account for true cases of inter-
ference with pre-existing U.S. commercial operations. 
 
6.1.3.  Enhancing the Default Presumption by Explicitly Declaring 
U.S. Leadership in Specific New Activities is in the National 
Security Interest of the United States. 
 
At first glance, national security concerns could potentially be 
the greater obstacle to a favorable decision, compared to interna-
tional obligation concerns.  This is due to the limited nature of OST 
obligations that might apply to commercial activities.  However, 
many of the new space activities most likely to occur in the near fu-
ture will probably cause less of a national security concern than 
appears in the remote sensing context.  As a general matter, it is in 
the U.S.’s national security interests to have U.S. companies be the 
first to engage in asteroid or lunar mining, and to establish private 
research labs or hotels in-orbit or on the Moon.  Thus, the inter-
agency process should be designed to act promptly on such appli-
cations.  The new activities of on-orbit satellite servicing or debris 
removal may contain more competing national security arguments. 
It stems from the fact that if operations go wrong, they may en-
danger national security assets by creating additional debris or 
move debris into a more populated orbit.  On balance, since some 
of the technology is akin to satellite weaponry, it is still in the U.S. 
interest if such activities are born by and engaged in by U.S. com-
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mercial entities first.  Congress could declare that U.S. leadership 
in these activities by U.S. commercial companies is in the national 
security interest.  This will prevent national security criteria for 
approval from being utilized to limit commercial operations, ex-
cept in very rare and essential cases, such as when the commercial 
operation might harmfully interfere with an existing critical U.S. 
government space asset.  The American Space Commerce Free En-
terprise Act bill contains such a declaration,222 and thus it should 
not fail to contain any national security criteria, or at least contain a 
bit more robust authority to protect federal government space as-
sets from harmful interference, for a rare instance in which the new 
activities raise such concerns. 
 
6.1.4.  Granting Lead Interagency Status to an Agency Directed to 
Promote Industry 
 
Both the Executive Branch’s proposed Mission Authorization 
Framework and Rep. Bridenstine’s proposed bill would entrust the 
FAA (or in the case of the Bridenstine bill, a newly created position 
of an Assistant Secretary for Commercial Space within the DOT) 
with leading the interagency process for reviewing missions and 
payloads, as well as issuing final decisions on applications.  Since 
the FAA has authority to “encourage, facilitate and promote” the 
commercial space industry, placing the FAA in the interagency 
lead may help establish a permissionless innovation esprit de corps 
within the interagency process.  In contrast, NOAA—the lead 
agency for remote sensing decisions—is not charged with promot-
ing the industry.  Having an agency with promotion authority lead 
the interagency process can help ensure that the benefits (including 
national security benefits) of an activity are fully considered.  It can 
also help ensure consideration of the potential foreign competition 
that might seek to benefit from less stringent authorization pro-
cesses abroad.  Additionally, “if an agency that has experience in 
licensing is given the lead authority this will help reduce transac-
                                                      
222 See American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 
115th Cong. (2017)  supra note 80, at § 2(5) (“The private exploration and use of 
outer space by nongovernmental entities will further the national security, foreign 
policy, and economic interests of the United States.”). 
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tion costs and avoid possible duplication in processes.”223  Thus, 
the FAA is likely the best candidate to be the lead agency because 
it has both promotion authority and experience in licensing and in-
ter-agency coordination in commercial space matters.  The problem 
with the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill’s at-
tempt to place authority over new in–orbit space activities in the 
Department of Commerce and not absolutely requiring an inter-
agency process, is several–fold.  If such authority is given to anoth-
er agency, duplication may result, as FAA–AST will still conduct a 
payload review, separately or as part of a launch license.  Given 
the State Department’s lead role in treaty interpretation and inter-
national consultations on space matters, and DOD’s knowledge of 
critical national security space assets, it is important that on-orbit 
licensing remain an interagency process.  Hence, “[s]imply adding 
an on-orbit component to the existing payload review, along with 
the other suggestions made in these eight principles, may be the 
least costly and least disruptive solution to solving the on-orbit au-
thorization gap.”224 
 
6.1.5.  Establish Deadlines with Executive Branch Notification and 
Reporting Requirements to Congress. 
 
In order to put some teeth, or at least pressure, behind statuto-
ry deadlines, and prevent years-long delays of the kind that oc-
curred in NOAA remote sensing licensing processes, Congress can 
place significant notification and reporting requirements on the 
Executive Branch in any delegation of on-orbit authority to the Ex-
ecutive Branch.  For example, Congress could require immediate 
notification to the House Science and Senate Commerce Space Sub-
committees when the deadline for a decision has passed.  It can al-
so require semi-annual reports on mission authorization (or en-
hanced payload review) applications and decisions, as well as on 
any foreign on-orbit activities and foreign licensing procedures.  
Such notification and reporting requirements may place subtle 
pressure on the Executive Branch to ensure timely decisions are 
                                                      
223 Reopening the American Frontier: Exploring How the Outer Space Treaty Will 
Impact before the Subcomm, on Space, Science and Competitiveness of the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 115th Cong. (2017) (Statement of Matthew P. Schaefer, 
American Branch of International Law Assoc. Space Law Committee). 
224 Id. at 14. 
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made, while also ensuring that they are keeping track of any for-
eign competitive pressures. 
 
6.1.6.  Establish an Ombuds as well as Possible Appeal Avenues to 
the President or Vice–President in Cases of Denial. 
 
Congress might even consider creating an ombuds225 with a top 
security clearance that is able to intervene in cases in which deci-
sions are delayed, or rationales for decisions are not fully explained 
or cannot be explained due to lack of proper security clearances by 
applicant company officials.  On numerous occasions executive 
ombuds, that take complaints regarding agency action, have been 
created by means of Congressional statutes.  In fact, there are so 
many ombuds that a Coalition of Federal Ombuds has been creat-
ed.226  Congress can also add the option of an appeal to a higher 
authority, such as the Vice President-led Space Council, recently 
re-created under the Trump Administration,227 or the President, in 
situations where the ombuds working with the interagency process 
and the company have not reached a satisfactory resolution. 
 
6.1.7.  Limit Chances for Regulatory Arbitrage and “Flags of 
Convenience” to Help Ensure Innovation Occurs in the United 
States. 
 
The space business is global and, in establishing any regulatory 
regime, the U.S. must be sensitive to avoid regulating in a manner 
that encourages the outflow of innovative space businesses to other 
spacefaring countries.  International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) regula-
                                                      
225 See Coalition of Federal Ombudsman, (Aug. 27, 2012), 
http://federalombuds.ed.gov/federalombuds/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/7WAC-NBA6] (explaining the purpose and resources 
provided by the Coalition of Federal Ombudsman, which facilitates ombuds 
serving United States government agencies). 
226 See id. (detailing the goals and services offered by the Coalition of Federal 
Ombuds to assist ombuds). 
227 See Exec. Order No. 13803, 82 Fed. Reg. 31429 (June 30, 2017); see also 
Leonard David, Playing the Space Trump Card: Relaunching a National Space Council, 
SPACE (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.space.com/35163-trump-administration-
national-space-council.html [https://perma.cc/G733-9LJG] (examining potential 
usefulness of President Trump’s idea of re-launching the National Space Council). 
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tions, even after substantial reform in the past several years, help 
prevent outsourcing to some degree. However, given the im-
portance of the space industry to national security and national 
economic interests of the United States, policy-makers still must be 
sensitive to this concern.228  In recognition of other countries’ ac-
tions, as well as space industries benefitting from similar frame-
works at least as favorable as the U.S. one, Congress just recently 
showed its concern for possible regulatory arbitrage among those 
seeking to access space.  In 2015, it passed a long-term (ten-year) 
extension of the promise of government indemnification for third 
party damages, above the amount of insurance required to be pur-
chased by launch licensees to place U.S. industry on roughly equal 
footing with foreign launch companies that benefit from third-
party liability caps enacted by their governments.229  Thus, when 
filling the on-orbit regulatory gap, Congress might now require the 
interagency process led by the FAA to consider in its decision–
making the global nature of the industry, and the goal of not plac-
ing U.S. commercial space entities at a competitive disadvantage 
when compared to the regulatory frameworks and authorization 
processes adopted by foreign countries.  The Congressional com-
mittee reports on any legislation can detail the very limited nature 
of the obligations in the OST that might apply to commercial space 
activities, laying out the checklist developed earlier in this arti-
cle.230  The law itself might also direct the President to ensure, 
through negotiation and consultation, that foreign countries are al-
so meeting the same minimum standards—e.g., not creating “flags 
of convenience”231 to attract the space industry.  Congress might 
even consider ensuring that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies 
(even those relying on foreign launch vehicles) receive U.S. author-
ization for their activities.  This latter provision would mean that 
Congress would choose the Mission Authorization Framework ap-
                                                      
228 Schaefer, supra note 45, at 225–27. 
229 Id. at 232–233. 
230 Id. at 36. 
231 See generally Frans G. von der Dunk, Towards Flags of Convenience in Space?, 
(Univ. of Neb.) (2012), 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=spac
elaw [https://perma.cc/5PFK-6AYF] (noting that, in the space context, “from the 
mere fact that national laws and licensing regimes are different it can not 
automatically be concluded that there is a risk in practice for ‘flags of 
convenience’ in outer space to become a real problem, so as to require or justify 
substantial efforts to deal with it for example at the UN level.”). 
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proach to this issue rather than following Rep. Bridenstine’s En-
hanced Payload Review, as the payload reviews only occur for 
payloads using U.S. launch vehicles. 
 
6.1.8.  Have the U.S. Government Both Encourage and Give 
Substantial Deference to Industry Standards. 
 
House Science Committee Space Subcommittee Chairman, Rep. 
Babin, recently proposed turning to “standards-setting bodies” and 
“self-regulating organizations” as alternatives to an authorize and 
supervise framework.232  However, these approaches cannot be al-
ternatives to an authorize and supervise framework while also 
maintaining consistency with OST Art. VI.  That is because Art. VI 
requires the government to be the one authorizing and supervis-
ing.  Yet, the spirit of Chairman Babin’s proposal is achievable, 
since there is no prohibition on the U.S. government deferring to 
industry-set standards, and standards of self-regulating organiza-
tions, in determining whether to authorize an activity.  For exam-
ple, COSPAR has planetary protection standards.  For a number of 
reasons, these standards, created and followed in a science-
inspired coalition of governments and scientists, do not create a 
floor for what constitutes harmful contamination under the OST.233  
The U.S. government recognizes that COSPAR standards do not 
constitute “subsequent practice establishing the agreement of the 
parties” under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in-
terpretation rules. Therefore, the U.S. government need not follow 
these standards in authorizing on-orbit activities.234  Instead, the 
U.S. government has the flexibility to set its own planetary protec-
tion standards in a commercial environment, or to follow industry-
set standards.  Congress recently has promoted industry standards 
over safety matters by requiring periodic reports from the FAA in 
consultation with industry on such matters every thirty months.235  
Congress could similarly push the FAA to promote industry 
standards on matters related to ensuring compliance with OST ob-
ligations by private parties—specifically non-interference and 
                                                      
232 Babin, supra note 2 at 5. 
233 Supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text. 
234 Id. 
235 Public Law No. 114–90, supra note 178. 
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harmful contamination (planetary protection) standards.  Indeed, 
the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill calls for the 
establishment of a private sector advisory committee to examine, 
among others, harmful interference and harmful contamination is-
sues.236  Of course, there could be some hurdles to industry estab-
lishing standards, such as concerns about releasing proprietary in-
formation to potential competitors, but nevertheless there should 
be mechanisms and processes that allow for standards that are 
greatly informed by industry such that the standards are friendly 
to commercial activity. 
 
6.2.  Two Approaches that Should Be Avoided 
 
Other suggestions have been made by current and former gov-
ernment officials to limit the extent of Executive authority over on-
orbit activities.  However, the drawbacks of these suggestions 
outweigh their benefits and should be avoided in any legislative 
solution. 
 
6.2.1.  Listing Specific Activities that Require Authorization or 
Giving Blanket Statutory Authorizations to Certain Activities. 
 
A former DOT/FAA official suggested listing specific activities 
that require authorization.237  The former official argues that specif-
ic listing is necessary so as not to run afoul of the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s non-delegation doctrine or the Due Process Clause.238  How-
ever, the Constitutional arguments made in favor of listing specific 
activities are inaccurate.  First, the non-delegation doctrine is a 
                                                      
236 See American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 
115th Cong. (2017) supra note 80 at § 3. 
237 See Montgomery, supra note 124 (discussing the United States compliance 
with the Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty); see also Montgomery, supra note 105 
(discussing application of the Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty to the private 
sector). 
238 See Laura Montgomery, Comments to the FAA on an Enhanced Payload 
Review, GROUND BASED SPACE MATTERS (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://groundbasedspacematters.com/index.php/2016/09/16/comments-to-the-
faa-on-an-enhanced-payload-review/#more-115 [https://perma.cc/QY9Y-3QVT] 
(arguing “the proposed enhanced payload review fails to provide commercial 
actors adequate notice as to what activity must obtain authorization”). 
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very weak one, that only requires Congress to provide an “intelli-
gible principle” to guide the Executive Branch or to exercise the es-
sentials of the legislative function.239  Delegating to the Executive 
Branch authority over activities that essentially require being 
placed aboard the equivalent of an intercontinental ballistic missile 
to engage in, and subjecting those activities to review based on a 
limited set of factors—including national security and international 
obligation compliance—seems to be narrower than many previous-
ly upheld delegations.  For example, U.S. courts upheld the price 
control delegations granted to President Nixon in the 1970’s that 
potentially applied to the entire economy.240 
Moreover, the Supreme Court jurisprudence in the famous 
Curtiss-Wright case confirms that Congress can paint with a very 
broad brush when delegating power in the foreign affairs and na-
tional security realms.241  The Supreme Court has not invalidated a 
delegation in over eight decades.242  If Congress chooses to require 
authorization for on-orbit activities generally, rather than a specific 
list of activities, it will be upheld in any court challenge.  Propo-
nents of listing specific activities that require authorization also ar-
gue that failure to do so is like Congress delegating power to the 
Executive Branch to authorize every activity in the State of Con-
necticut.243  The analogy collapses immediately based on federal-
ism concerns present in one and not in the other.  The Connecticut 
hypothetical would have the federal government regulating in are-
as of traditional state competence.  Federal regulation of on-orbit 
activities does not intrude on traditional areas of state regulation.  
The closer, although still imperfect, analogy is if Congress delegat-
ed authority to the Executive Branch to restrict travel of U.S. citi-
                                                      
239 See, e.g., J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
240 See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North Am., 
AFL-CIO v. Connally, 337 F.Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (approving delegation to the 
President under a statute that provided the President is authorized to issue such 
orders and regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, 
wages, and salaries at a level not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970). 
241 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
242 See Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Non-Delegation Doctrine 
Returns after Long Hiatus, SCOTUS BLOG (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/scotus-for-law-students-non-delegation-
doctrine-returns-after-long-hiatus [https://perma.cc/4QC9-8ARL] (discussing 
non-delegation doctrine being recently revisited). 
243 See Laura Montgomery, supra note 105 (discussing application of the 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty to the private sector). 
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zens to, and their activities upon arrival in, other non-sovereignty 
zones, such as the high seas or Antarctica.  The federal government 
could impose such restrictions on travel to ensure compliance with 
international obligations or to protect U.S. national security. 
Due process arguments for failure to list specific activities, and 
thus, to provide proper notice to those potentially regulated, will 
also fail.  Those boarding or placing objects on board rockets in-
tended for LEO or beyond have adequate notice that they need au-
thorization involving a limited set of criteria under any of the pro-
posed solutions to fill the regulatory gap.  Policy reasons also 
caution against specifically listing activities requiring authoriza-
tion.  The Administration’s report proposing a Mission Authoriza-
tion Framework discussed the most likely activities to occur within 
the near future—mining, on-orbit or lunar labs, facilities or hotels, 
and on-orbit satellite servicing—and one could, in theory, simply 
limit the framework to those activities.  But doing so would come 
with costs.  It is often hard to predict which new technologies will 
come to market first. There is always the unexpected idea that pro-
ceeds to market quicker than anticipated.  Any activity not on the 
list is disadvantaged, relative to listed activities, because it would 
be subject to the exact same cloudy situation facing all on–orbit ac-
tivities currently—one in which the Executive Branch may seek to 
leverage its payload authority to prevent the activity, or alterna-
tively may not, because it lacks authority.  In either case, the non-
listed activity’s investors are in a difficult situation—if blocked, 
they may be left with only a litigation option, and even if not 
blocked, they may suffer ramifications due to questions over 
whether the U.S. complied with its OST Art. VI obligations. 
Remember that, in terms of international obligation compli-
ance, much of what must be considered in an authorization and 
supervision process are Art. IX’s non-interference and anti-
contamination obligations.244  Take a company that is considering a 
lunar brewing facility—an idea not so far-fetched, it turns out.245  
There is no way to say in advance whether the lunar brewing facili-
ty’s chosen location will interfere with the operations of another 
                                                      
244 Id. at 34-5. 
245 See Henry Bodkin, Scientist Brewing Up Plan to Make Beer on the Moon, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 22, 2017), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/01/22/scientists-brewing-plan-
make-beer-moon [https://perma.cc/7V8X-YY7Q] (discussing a plan to find out 
whether beer can be brewed on the Moon). 
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entity—it all depends on the location chosen and the plans of the 
business.  It is for this reason that Chairman Babin’s idea for “blan-
ket statutory authorizations for classes of activities”246 will also be 
hard to implement.  Many, if not all, space activities could be per-
formed in a manner consistent or inconsistent with the OST—all 
depending on the facts.  For example, Congress has already made 
clear that asteroid and space resource mining is an approved activ-
ity—so much so that Congress has essentially granted property 
rights in extracted resources garnered from those activities.  But 
there is still a need for those activities to go through the “light 
touch” authorization and supervision process to determine wheth-
er the chosen location of those activities harmfully interferes with 
foreign space activities, or whether the rover and operations will 
harmfully contaminate a celestial body.  Of course, there may be 
some “Earthly,” mundane activities taking place within research 
labs or space hotels (i.e., in-facility activities) that may cause no 
concern, such as teeth brushing.  Congress could direct the author-
izing agency to create a list of “in-facility” activities that are in es-
sence pre-approved, recognizing that disposal of certain items 
(such as toothbrushes) may still require review.  Congress might 
also seek to exclude these types of activities via definitions.  For 
example, the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act bill 
excluded from its definition of space object “an article on board a 
space object that is only intended for use inside a space object.”247 
 
6.2.2.  Relying on the Common Law of Torts or a Newly Created 
Federal Statutory Cause of Action for Unreasonable Interference. 
 
Using existing tort law,248 or even a newly created federal statu-
tory cause of action, as a replacement for an authorization and su-
pervision framework administered by the Executive Branch that 
looks at U.S. international obligations—especially non-interference 
obligations—creates several problems.  First, authorization indi-
cates that “official permission” is obtained, and the context of that 
authorization suggests the U.S. must assure conformity with non-
                                                      
246 See Babin, supra note 2. 
247 American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2017, H.R. 2809, 115th 
Cong. (2017) supra note 80 at § 80101(11)(C)(i). 
248 See id. at 5 (listing tort law as a possible solution to be considered). 
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interference obligations in Art. IX of the OST.  Tort law solutions 
do not meet the ordinary meaning of the word “authorize,” but ra-
ther attempt to remedy an actual case of harmful interference after 
the fact.  Further, tort law solutions in domestic courts, for actions 
occurring in outer space, face several potential problems, including 
difficulties in basing cases on trespass given the lack of surface or 
sub-surface property rights, as well as difficulties in fact collection 
in the outer space arena.  Given the global nature of the aerospace 
industry, other procedural barriers will limit the effectiveness of 
relying on litigation to meet Art. IX obligations, such as obtaining 
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants, or enforcing U.S. 
court judgments abroad, among others.249 
The original July 2014 Asteroids Act bill (H.R. 5063) did seek to 
create a non-interference right and a federal court action to enforce 
the right.  Specifically, it provided the following: 
(b) FREEDOM FROM HARMFUL INTERFERENCE 
As between any entities over which the United States can 
exercise jurisdiction, any assertion of superior right to exe-
cute specific commercial asteroid resource utilization activi-
ties in outer space shall prevail if it is found to be first in 
time, derived upon a reasonable basis, and in accordance 
with all existing international obligations of the United 
States. 
RELIEF FROM HARMFUL INTERFERENCE 
A United States commercial asteroid resource utilization 
entity may bring an action for appropriate legal or equita-
ble relief, or both, under this chapter for any action, by an-
other private entity, compromising the right to conduct its 
operations free of harmful interference.250 
However, this federally-created non-interference action was 
dropped from the final version of the U.S. Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015.251  Having federal courts cre-
ate rules for what constitutes unreasonable and harmful interfer-
ence is not preferred to solutions negotiated between government 
                                                      
249 See Schaefer, supra note 45, at 256–62 (discussing the potential for litigation 
by SFPs in foreign court). 
250 Asteroids Act, H.R. 5063, 113th Cong. § 51302 (2014). 
251 Pub. L. No. 114-90, supra note 178. 
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and industry, or between the U.S. government and foreign gov-
ernments, given the diplomatic and political sensitivities.  En-
forcement of any such judgments in foreign jurisdictions may also 
face numerous hurdles,252 as well as if U.S. courts engage in a U.S. 
centric-view of how to balance the competing principles of “free 
access to all areas of celestial bodies” and the ban on surface or 
sub-surface rights in Art. I and II of the OST on the one hand, with 
the “due regard” and avoid “harmful interference” obligations of 
Article IX on the other hand.  It is better to leave judgments on 
granular matters to the Executive Branch that can consult with and 
negotiate with U.S. industry and foreign governments, free of 
standards of proof and the evidentiary rules of a courtroom.  Fur-
ther, other countries might open their courts to similar actions 
against U.S. entities, leading to parallel litigation and competing 
judgments.  Lastly, the Asteroids Act’s harmful interference action 
would only have applied to foreign entities over which U.S. courts 
could exercise personal jurisdiction,253 whereas the Executive 
Branch negotiations and leverage can also be brought to bear with 
respect to actors over which U.S. courts lack personal jurisdiction. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
Permissionless innovation is rarely pure or unadulterated, but 
rather, it is contextual.  The space domain context necessitates ex 
ante, case-by-case approval processes, if the U.S. is to comply with 
its international obligations and ensure protection of national secu-
rity.  The current regulatory gap concerning new on-orbit activities 
by commercial space entities appears to come close to a (nearly) 
pure or unadulterated form that on its surface appears to avoid all 
need for ex ante, or any other, review.  Indeed, advocates of the 
nearly pure form of permissionless innovation seek to ensure this 
status quo by even ignoring the long-established, agreed-upon 
rules of treaty interpretation that bind the U.S. government to ar-
gue that the U.S. does not need to authorize and supervise new on-
orbit activities to ensure compliance by commercial entities with 
                                                      
252 See generally Asteroids Act, supra note 250 (limiting the jurisdiction under 
the act to “between any entities over which the United States can exercise 
jurisdiction.”). 
253 See id. at § 51303. 
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OST obligations.  But ironically, this nearly pure form of permis-
sionless innovation fails to achieve the benefits of permissionless 
innovation for the innovators. 
If the regulatory gap continues, the Executive Branch will con-
tinue to face a Hobbesian choice: allow on-orbit activities without 
review, and thus violate U.S. international obligations under the 
Outer Space Treaty and risk failing to take account of national se-
curity concerns, or, alternatively, seek to leverage existing payload 
review authority in a manner that is likely not true to Congression-
al intent to review and possibly block such activities where they 
conflict with the OST or national security interests.  Commercial 
space businesses are in an equally poor situation: risking foreign 
government retaliation in a variety of forms for engaging in activi-
ty that does not comply with the OST, or being faced with the pro-
spect of costly and time-consuming litigation against the U.S. gov-
ernment, a substantial customer of commercial space services, 
arguing that the Executive Branch exceeded its delegated powers.  
Investment in new on-orbit activities will be chilled as a result of 
this regulatory uncertainty. 
Fortunately, Congress can enact a “light touch” regulatory so-
lution that fills the gap—providing compliance with international 
obligations, protection of national security, and regulatory certain-
ty for U.S. space businesses—and at the same time ensures that 
permissionless innovation thinking and esprit de corps controls the 
interagency approval process.  Congress can do so by adjusting the 
three existing proposals to fill the gap—the Mission Authorization 
framework proposed by the Obama White House’s OSTP, the En-
hanced Payload Review process proposed by Rep. Bridenstine in 
the Space Renaissance Act bill, and the Certification Process pro-
posed by the House Science Committee’s American Space Com-
merce Free Enterprise Act—to comport fully with the eight core 
features recommended in this article.  These core features include: 
creating a default presumption in favor of approval, but without a 
deemed authorized provision; limiting (but not too narrowly) the 
factors that can be considered by the Executive Branch; enhancing 
the default presumption by explicitly declaring that U.S. leadership 
in specific new activities being contemplated is in the national se-
curity interest; granting lead interagency status to an agency di-
rected to promote industry and experienced in licensing and ad-
ministering an interagency process; establishing deadlines with 
notification and reporting requirements to Congress; establishing 
an ombuds and/or appeal avenues to the President or Vice-
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President-led Space Council in cases of denial of approval; limiting 
chances for regulatory arbitrage and possible “flags of conven-
ience,” to help ensure innovation occurs in United States; and hav-
ing the U.S. government encourage and give substantial deference 
to industry standards.  An ex ante licensing process with features 
that ensure a default in favor of approval, along with timely, 
transparent, and appealable decisions, with deference to industry 
standards, fits comfortably within a permissionless innovation line 
of thinking. 
However, two suggested amendments to the existing proposed 
approaches should be avoided: first, listing specific activities that 
require authorization or giving blanket statutory authorizations to 
certain activities, and, second, relying on the common law of torts 
or a newly created federal statutory cause of action to prevent 
harmful interference.  The first is not mandated by Constitutional 
requirements and actually preserves the cloudy situation for non-
listed activities.  The latter places decisions in non-expert hands 
without the benefit of negotiation by the Executive Branch with 
foreign countries and with the industry over what should consti-
tute harmful interference. 
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